

Australia-China Relations  
Institute  
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# UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2022

The Australia-China  
relationship: What do  
Australians think?

**Elena Collinson and Paul F. Burke**

May 2022

The Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) is an independent, non-partisan research institute based at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS). UTS:ACRI's mission is to inform Australia's engagement with China through substantive dialogue, and research and analysis grounded in scholarly rigour.

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# Executive summary


Now in its second year, the *UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2022* by the Australia-China Relations Institute and the Centre for Business Intelligence & Data Analytics at the University of Technology Sydney takes the Australian public's pulse on current aspects of, and recent events in, the Australia-China relationship with a view to better understanding this immediate past and some of the trends which may shape its future.

It examines how views have changed since the inaugural 2021 poll and lays out divisions in opinion within four demographic areas: age groups, state/territory of residence, geographical location (urban or rural) and how the respondent voted in the 2019 federal election.

The mixture of views revealed by the *UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2022* suggests that the presentation of the Australia-China relationship through a binary lens or a zero-sum prism does not completely align with perceptions in the wider community. There remains a divide between government views and much analytical commentary on the one hand, and popular attitudes on the other. However, in tracking the change in attitudes in some areas between this year and the last, it might also be said that the dominance of the elite narrative does appear to be slowly becoming more entrenched in the public consciousness.

Nonetheless, public opinion with respect to Australia-China relations remains in a state of flux. The results do not paint a neat picture. But by their very complexity they play a critical role in charting the intricacies of the bilateral relationship and helping think through the challenges. All in all, they serve to underline that this is the most challenging period Australian diplomacy has faced since Japan threatened the East Asian order in the 1930s.

*Note: Responses for the UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2022 were collected before news regarding China's security agreement with the Solomon Islands broke. The flow-on effects of this development will be measured in the 2023 Poll.*



# 1. Overall views on the Australia-China relationship

**Support for building stronger connections and ties, a strong relationship:** Six in 10 Australians (60 percent) believe that Australia should continue to try to build strong connections and ties, and have a strong relationship with China. The level of support for this sentiment has effectively remained the same since 2021 (61 percent).

Australian Capital Territory residents are most supportive of this sentiment (72 percent) compared with those residing in other states and territories, as are Australian Labor Party voters (66 percent) relative to those who voted for other political parties in the 2019 federal election.

**Concerns:** Concerns about the relationship are high, with nearly three-quarters of Australians (73 percent) expressing misgivings about Australia's relationship with China. The sentiment remains more or less steady from 2021 (74 percent).

Older Australians aged 55+ (82 percent) are the most concerned about the relationship. Liberal/National voters (78 percent) also express more concern than those who voted for other political parties in 2019.

**Benefits:** Over half of Australians (58 percent) also see the benefits of Australia's relationship with China, but the level of perceived benefits has fallen slightly from 2021 (62 percent).

**Mistrust of the Chinese government:** The majority of Australians (73 percent) express mistrust of the Chinese government, although the overall level of mistrust has decreased slightly from 2021 (76 percent).

Liberal/Nationals voters (83 percent) and older Australians aged 55+ (81 percent) are more mistrusting, while younger Australians aged 18-34 (64 percent) are less mistrusting.

**The Australian government's management of China relations:** About one-third of Australians (34 percent) say that the Australian government is managing Australia's relationship with China well, with 43 percent disagreeing. There has been little change in overall approval of government management since 2021 (32 percent).

**A harder Australian government line on China:** More than half of Australians (58 percent) express support for a harder line to be adopted by the Australian government with respect to its policies dealing with China, down five points from 2021 (63 percent).

**Changing views:** Six in 10 Australians (60 percent) say that their view on China 'has become more negative following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic', a continuation of views expressed in 2021 (62 percent).

Older Australians aged 55+ (68 percent) are more likely to confirm a downturn in opinion on China, while younger Australians aged 18-34 (52 percent) are less likely.

**Responsibility for improving the Australia-China relationship:** A clear majority of Australians (78 percent) agree that 'The responsibility for improving the relationship between Australia and China lies with both countries'. Pressed on an either-or proposition, more Australians believe that the responsibility lies with China (45 percent) rather than Australia (32 percent).

**Future outlook:** The pessimism expressed last year by Australians about the short to medium term prospects for improvement in relations between Australia and China in 2021 has remained steady, with 28 percent of Australians saying they believed bilateral relations 'will improve in the next three years'.



## 2. Federal election 2022

**Political party best placed to handle Australia's China policy:** Australians are evenly split on which major political party will best manage Australia's China policy. Thirty-six percent nominate the Liberal/Nationals while 35 percent nominate the Australian Labor Party.

**China policy – Impact on voting behaviour:** Four in ten Australians (40 percent) say that the Australian government's management of China policy is an issue that will have an impact on their vote in this year's federal election.

The Australians who say that China policy will have an impact on the way in which they vote are more likely to express overall concerns about Australia's relationship with China (81 percent) and mistrust of the Chinese government (78 percent), as well as alarm and apprehension about Australia-China relations in other survey areas. These include statements such as:

- 'The Chinese government is willing to use its trade and investment ties with Australia to punish Australia over political disagreements' (84 percent)
- 'Foreign interference stemming from China is a major problem' (81 percent)
- 'Australia is too economically reliant on China' (80 percent)
- 'Australia should place sanctions, such as travel and financial bans, on Chinese officials and entities involved in human rights violations' (77 percent)
- 'The risk of arbitrary detention is a concern when considering travel to China' (77 percent)
- 'China's artificial island-building in the South China Sea is a threat to Australia's security' (77 percent)
- 'The Australian government should force Landbridge, the Chinese company that bought the 99-year lease to the Port of Darwin in 2015, to sell the port back to the government' (72 percent)

## 3. Political communication

**A vocal stance?:** While only a minority of Australians (27 percent) say that 'The Australian government should not publicly call out actions by the Chinese government that Australia disagrees with', with 48 percent disagreeing with the statement. Australians (63 percent) also believe that 'The Australian government's disputes with the Chinese government are better communicated through diplomatic channels rather than public statements'.

**Diplomatic boycott of Beijing Winter Olympics:** Nearly six in 10 Australians (58 percent) agree that 'The Australian government was right to participate in a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022'.

**Call for an international COVID-19 investigation:** Australians remain supportive of the Australian government's 2020 call for an inquiry, with about seven in 10 (69 percent) agreeing that 'The Australian government was right to publicly call for an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19'.

## 4. Military and security

**China as a security threat:** Nearly three-quarters of Australians (73 percent) say that ‘China is a security threat to Australia’, up six points from 2021 (67 percent).

Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (83 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

**Support for an increase in Australia’s defence spending:** Seven in 10 Australians (70 percent) say that ‘The Australian government is right to increase defence spending, to balance, among other considerations, China’s growing military might’. Only eight percent disagree.

Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (85 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree.

**Regional stability and security:** Half of Australians (50 percent) say that ‘Australia’s relationship with China contributes to regional stability and security’, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (52 percent).

**Conflict over Taiwan:** Australians are this year more inclined to support Australian engagement in military conflict should Taiwan become a military flashpoint compared to 2021, especially if the US is involved.

In the event of military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, about four in 10 Australians (42 percent) say that ‘Australia should remain neutral’. This is an 11-point decrease from 2021 (53 percent). More than half of Australians (56 percent) say that in this scenario ‘Australia should lend military support to the United States’. This is an 11-point increase from 2021 (45 percent). Twenty percent disagree.

About four in ten Australians (39 percent) say that ‘If China launches a military attack on Taiwan, Australia should send troops to go to Taiwan’s defence’. Thirty-four percent disagree.

**Cybersecurity:** A clear majority of Australians (81 percent) agree that ‘The Australian government is right to publicly call out any Chinese state-sponsored cybersecurity attacks on Australia’s digital systems’.

Nearly seven in 10 Australians (68 percent) believe that ‘The Chinese government is monitoring the communications of Australians closely with apps such as WeChat’ and almost half (47 percent) believe ‘Australia should ban Chinese owned apps such as TikTok and WeChat’.

**The Belt and Road Initiative:** More Australians now believe ‘The Australian government is right not to sign up to/participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative’ (57 percent) compared with 2021 (53 percent).

**The South China Sea:** Nearly two-thirds of Australians (64 percent) say that ‘China’s artificial island-building in the South China Sea is a threat to Australia’s security’, up five points from 2021 (59 percent).

## 5. The United States

**Balancing act:** ‘About six in 10 Australians (61 percent) believe that ‘Australia can enjoy a good relationship with both China and the United States at the same time’.

**Influence in the region:** Australians are slightly less convinced that ‘China has more influence than the US in Australia’s regional neighbourhood’ this year (61 percent) compared with last year (65 percent).

## 6. Trade and investment

**The economic relationship overall:** About three-quarters of Australians (74 percent) say that ‘Australia is too economically reliant on China’, a six-point decrease from 2021 (80 percent). The majority of Australians (77 percent) also continue to express ‘extreme worry’ about China’s trade restrictions on Australian exports.

About four in 10 Australians (42 percent) say that ‘The Australian government has been successful in efforts to diversify trade, reducing Australia’s economic exposure to China’

While six in 10 Australians (60 percent) acknowledge that ‘Without close economic engagement with China, Australia would not be as prosperous as it currently is’, about half of Australians (51 percent) say that ‘Australia’s economic relationship with China is more of an economic risk than an economic opportunity’.

### **The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP):**

Australians are lukewarm about supporting China’s bid to join the agreement, with about three in 10 Australians (31 percent) agreeing that ‘The Australian government should support China’s bid to join’ the CPTPP. Australians express stronger support for Taiwan’s bid, with two-thirds (66 percent) saying ‘The Australian government should support Taiwan’s bid to join’ the CPTPP.

**Trade case study – Tourism:** Against the backdrop of COVID-19 and continuing restrictions on travel, seven in 10 Australians (70 percent) say that ‘Tourists from China provide a major economic benefit to Australia’, although Queensland residents (63 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. About six in 10 Australians (62 percent) say that ‘Australia should continue towards making Australia an attractive destination for Chinese tourists’, and slightly more than half of Australians (53 percent) believe that ‘Encouraging tourism from China needs to be a post-COVID-19 priority for Australia’.

**Trade case study – Education:** About two-thirds of Australians (67 percent) say that ‘International students from China provide a major economic benefit to Australia’, a nine-point decrease from 2021 (76 percent). Three-quarters of Australians (75 percent) agree that ‘Australian universities are too financially reliant on international students from China’, a six-point decrease from 2021 (81 percent). Forty-six percent of Australians say that ‘Encouraging international students from China to return to study in Australia needs to be a post-COVID-19 priority for Australia’.

**Foreign investment:** While just over half of Australians (53 percent) agree that ‘Foreign investment from China has created job opportunities in Australia’, general support for foreign investment from China remains fairly low, with just under a third of Australians (30 percent) saying that ‘Foreign investment from China should be supported by Australians’. Almost half of Australians (49 percent) think that ‘Foreign investment from China is more detrimental than beneficial to Australia’.

### **Investment case study – Port of Darwin:**

Six in 10 Australians (60 percent) say that ‘The Australian government should force Landbridge, the Chinese company that bought the 99-year lease to the Port of Darwin in 2015, to sell the port back to the government’.

**Investment case study – Agriculture:** There is little fluctuation in Australian views on Chinese ownership of agricultural assets, with 2022 representing a continuation of the fairly high levels of concern expressed in 2021. Sixty-five percent of Australians say that ‘Chinese ownership of agricultural assets (e.g., land, food processing facilities) in Australia is more concerning than ownership by companies from other countries’. Almost seven in 10 Australians (69 percent) say that ‘Chinese ownership of agricultural assets (e.g., land, food processing facilities) in Australia presents a threat to Australia’s food security’.

### **Investment case study – Residential real estate:**

Australians also continue to express strong concerns about Chinese investment in Australian residential real estate. Nearly in eight in 10 Australians (79 percent) say that ‘Foreign buyers from China drive up Australian housing prices’. About seven in 10 Australians say that ‘Chinese investors in Australian real estate have made it difficult for first home buyers in Australia to enter the market’ (71 percent) and that ‘Chinese investors have negatively affected the rental market for residential real estate in Australia’ (69 percent). A clear majority of Australians (80 percent) believe ‘Australia should restrict the amount of investment in residential real estate that is permitted from Chinese investors’, with Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (90 percent) at the 2019 federal election in strongest agreement.

**Business ties:** Australians are still generally supportive of business ties between Australia and China continuing to be forged. About six in 10 Australians (61 percent) say ‘Australian companies should continue to pursue business opportunities with China’. But Australians also express increasing reservations, stemming from the Chinese government’s domestic policies, saying Australia should not do business with China because of its ‘record on human rights’ (49 percent, up six points from 43 percent in 2021); ‘domestic censorship of media, internet and other forms of communication’ (42 percent); and ‘record on environmental practices’ (36 percent, up four points from 32 percent in 2021).

## **7. Society**

**The Australian-Chinese community:** Fifty-nine percent of Australians say that ‘Political tensions in the Australia-China relationship are negatively impacting Australians of Chinese origin’, a four-point decrease from 2021 (63 percent). Australian Capital Territory residents (74 percent) are more likely to agree with this statement compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. Just over four in 10 Australians (42 percent) say ‘Australians of Chinese origin can be mobilised by the Chinese government to undermine Australia’s interests and social cohesion’, a three-point increase from 2021 (39 percent). Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (50 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

**Interference and influence:** About two-thirds of Australians (67 percent) say that ‘Foreign interference in Australia stemming from China is more concerning than foreign interference from other countries’, with 69 percent stating that ‘Foreign interference in Australia stemming from China is a major problem’. A comparable number of Australians (65 percent) also state that ‘Foreign interference stemming from Russia is a major problem’. Nearly half of Australians (48 percent) say that ‘Australian values and traditions are being undermined by Chinese government influence in Australia’.

About a third of Australians (31 percent) say that ‘The Australian government is successfully responding to Chinese government interference in Australia’, four points down from 2021 (35 percent).

**Support for sanctions legislation:** Sixty-five percent of Australians say that ‘Australia should place sanctions, such as travel and financial bans, on Chinese officials and entities involved in human rights violations’.

**Arbitrary detention:** About two-thirds of Australians (66 percent) agree that ‘The risk of arbitrary detention is a concern when considering travel to China’, down six points from 2021 (72 percent). Sixty-five percent say that ‘China is willing to detain/arrest Australian citizens without any legal basis to punish Australia over political disagreements’.

**International students:** Just over half of Australians (54 percent) say that ‘International students from China help strengthen the people-to-people links between the two countries’, four points down from 2021 (58 percent). In terms of concerns regarding international students, nearly one-third of Australians (32 percent) say that ‘International students from China are potentially reducing the quality of education at Australian universities’, eight points down from 2021 (40 percent). About four in 10 Australians (42 percent) say that ‘International students from China mean there are less places for domestic students to study in their choice of Australian university’.

## 8. University and research

**Freedom of academic speech:** Half of Australians (50 percent) say that ‘Australian university ties with China compromise Australian freedom of speech’.

**Research collaboration (General):** Nearly half of Australians (49 percent) say that ‘Research collaborations between academics from Australia and China makes Australia more competitive internationally’. About six in 10 Australians (61 percent) agree that ‘Academics from Australia should continue to partner with academics from China to undertake research projects’.

**Research collaboration (Science):** Nearly seven in 10 Australians (69 percent) agree that ‘Australian scientists working with Chinese scientists is beneficial for Australia’, five points up from 2021 (64 percent).

## 9. Global and regional cooperation

A slightly lower proportion of Australians see the benefits of Australia working cooperatively with China to tackle global issues compared with 2021. Sixty-nine percent of Australians say ‘It is beneficial for Australia to work with China on global issues, such as climate change and global health’, five points down from 2021 (74 percent). Support for bilateral cooperation on regional issues remains steady, with 72 percent of Australians saying ‘It is beneficial for Australia to work with China on regional issues, such as ending malaria in the Pacific’. Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (81 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree with this statement.

# Introduction




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Nonetheless, public opinion with respect to Australia-China relations remains in a state of flux. The results do not paint a neat picture. But by their very complexity they play a critical role in charting the intricacies of the bilateral relationship and helping think through the challenges. All in all, they serve to underline that this is the most challenging period Australian diplomacy has faced since Japan threatened the East Asian order in the 1930s.



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# 1. Overall views on the Australia-China relationship




# 1.1 Background

Prime Minister Scott Morrison briefly returned to the decreasingly deployed descriptor ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ to characterise the Australia-China relationship during a press conference at the G7 last year.<sup>1</sup> He also acknowledged that ‘living with China... is the goal’.<sup>2</sup>

However, as Canberra maintains that it has ‘done nothing to injure [the] partnership [with China] – nothing at all’<sup>3</sup> and Beijing continues to insist that Australia ‘must take all responsibility’<sup>4</sup> for the breakdown in relations, the diplomatic trough continues.

Views on the Australia-China relationship within the government are generally bleak – for example, when Defence Minister Peter Dutton was asked whether, in his estimation, Australia was already ‘in a cold war with China at the moment’, a rebuttal was not forthcoming.<sup>5</sup>

Fallout from political friction between the two countries continues to be felt across a number of Australian sectors including, but not limited to, government, business and industry, media and academia and research. People-to-people links have come under strain, and the Australian-Chinese community continue to feel the effects of tensions.




# 1.2 Building stronger connections and ties, a strong relationship


Six in 10 Australians (60 percent) believe that Australia should continue to try to build strong connections and ties, and have a strong relationship with China. This reflects minimal change from 2021 (61 percent). Twenty-four percent express neutrality and 17 percent disagree (Figure 1).

**A state/territory divide:** Australian Capital Territory residents (72 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **An urban/rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (54 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (66 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (53 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 1. Support for Australia building stronger connections and ties, having a strong relationship with China



**Figure 2. Predictors of support for Australia building stronger connections and ties, having a strong relationship with China**



The biggest factor driving support for the sentiment was among survey respondents who perceived the benefits of the Australia-China relationship. Respondents who concurrently expressed concerns about the bilateral relationship were not precluded from also expressing support for Australia building stronger connections and ties, and having a strong relationship with China (Figure 2).

While the level of satisfaction expressed at the Australian government's management of the relationship did not have any significant bearing on this sentiment, those who expressed mistrust of the Chinese government and who tended towards agreeing a harder stance on China ought to be adopted by the Australian government were less likely to support the view that Australia should build stronger connections and ties and have a strong relationship with China (Figure 2).

**Table 1. Impact of latent factors on support for building stronger connections and ties, having a strong relationship with China**

	More supportive	Less supportive
State	Australian Capital Territory	-
Gender	Male	Female
Age	-	-
Location (Urban/rural)	-	Small rural
Household type	-	-
Education (highest level)	Bachelor's degree	High school
Employment	Retired	Unemployed
Income	Higher income (>\$78,000 p.a.)	Lower income (<\$34,000 p.a.)
Voting behaviour in the 2019 federal election	Australian Labor Party; Liberal/National	Minority party

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses agreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported residing in the Australian Capital Territory; their gender as male; completing a bachelor's degree as their highest level of education; their employment status as retired; earning a higher income (more than \$78,000 per annum); and either voting for the Australian Labor Party or the Liberal/Nationals in the 2019 federal election (Table 1).

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses disagreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported their gender as female; residing in a small rural location; completing high school as their highest level of education; their employment status as unemployed; earning a lower income of less than \$34,000 per annum; and voting for a minority party in the 2019 federal election (Table 1).

# 1.3 Concerns

Nearly three-quarters of Australians (73 percent) express concerns about Australia’s relationship with China. The sentiment remains more or less steady from 2021 (74 percent). Eighteen percent express neutrality and nine percent disagree (Figure 3).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (82 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (64 percent) are less likely to agree. **A state/territory divide:** South Australia residents (81 percent) and Tasmania residents (80 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (78 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (67 percent) are less likely to agree.

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses agreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported residing in South Australia or Tasmania in a large rural location; occupying an older age bracket (aged 47+); earning a higher income (more than \$78,000 per annum); and voting for the Australian Labor Party in the 2019 federal election (Table 2).

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses disagreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported residing in the Northern Territory in a small rural location; occupying a younger age bracket (aged 18-46); and not voting in the 2019 federal election (Table 2).

Figure 3. Concerns about Australia’s relationship with China




Table 2. Impact of latent factors on concerns about Australia's relationship with China

	More concerned	Less concerned
State	South Australia; Tasmania	Northern Territory
Gender	-	-
Age	Older (aged 47+)	Younger (aged 18-46)
Location (Urban/rural)	Large rural	Small rural
Household type	-	-
Education (highest level)	-	-
Employment	-	-
Income	Higher income (>\$78,000 p.a.)	-
Voting behaviour in the 2019 federal election	Australian Labor Party	Did not vote

# 1.4 Benefits

Over half of Australians (58 percent) say they see the benefits of Australia’s relationship with China. This is a four-point decrease from 2021 (62 percent). Twenty-two percent express neutrality and 20 percent disagree (Figure 4).

**A state/territory divide:** Australian Capital Territory residents (69 percent) are more likely to agree with the sentiment than residents in other Australian states and territories.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (63 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (53 percent) are less likely to agree.

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses agreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported their gender as male; residing in a small metropolitan location; completing a bachelor’s degree as their highest level of education; their employment status as retired; earning a higher income (more than \$78,000 per annum); and either voting for the Australian Labor Party or the Liberal/Nationals in the 2019 federal election (Table 3).

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses disagreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported residing in Victoria; their gender as female; completing a certificate/trade/diploma as their highest level of education; their employment status as unemployed; earning a lower income (less than \$34,000 per annum); and voting for a minority party in the 2019 federal election (Table 3).

Figure 4. **Benefits of Australia’s relationship with China**




Table 3. **Impact of latent factors on the benefits of Australia’s relationship with China**

	More beneficial	Less beneficial
State	-	Victoria
Gender	Male	Female
Age	-	-
Location (Urban/rural)	Small metropolitan	-
Household type	-	-
Education (highest level)	Bachelor’s degree	Certificate/Trade/ Diploma
Employment	Retired	Unemployed
Income	Higher income (>\$78,000 p.a.)	Lower income (<\$34,000 p.a.)
Voting behaviour in the 2019 federal election	Australian Labor Party; Liberal/National	Minority party

# 1.5 Mistrust of the Chinese government

Seventy-three percent of Australians express mistrust of the Chinese government. This is a three-point decrease from 2021 (76 percent). Seventeen percent express neutrality and 10 percent disagree (Figure 5).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (81 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (64 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (83 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (65 percent) are less likely to agree.

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses agreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported residing in New South Wales; occupying an older age bracket (aged 47+); living in a household classified as couples with no children; their employment status as unemployed; and voting for the Liberal/Nationals in the 2019 federal election (Table 4).

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses disagreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported occupying a younger age bracket (aged 18-46); living in a household classified as parent(s) with children; their employment status as retired; and voting for the Australian Labor Party in the 2019 federal election (Table 4).

Figure 5. Mistrust of the Chinese government




Table 4. Impact of latent factors on mistrust of the Chinese government

	More mistrusting	Less mistrusting
State	New South Wales	-
Gender	-	-
Age	Older (aged 47+)	Younger (aged 18-46)
Location (Urban/rural)	-	-
Household type	Couples with no children	Parent(s) with children
Education (highest level)	-	-
Employment	Unemployed	Retired
Income	-	-
Voting behaviour	Liberal/National	Australian Labor Party

# 1.6 The Australian government's management of China relations

About a third of Australians (34 percent) say that the Australian government is managing Australia's relationship with China well, a general continuation of sentiment expressed in 2021 (32 percent). Twenty-four percent express neutrality and 43 percent disagree (Figure 6).

**A state/territory divide:** Tasmania residents (25 percent) and Australian Capital Territory residents (27 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (52 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for the Australian Labor Party (23 percent) or a minority party (25 percent) are less likely to agree.

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses agreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported occupying a younger age bracket (aged 18-46); living in a household classified as parent(s) with dependent children; earning a lower income (less than \$34,000 per annum); and voting for the Liberal/Nationals in the 2019 federal election (Table 5).

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses disagreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported residing in Tasmania; occupying an older age bracket (aged 47+); completing a certificate/trade/diploma as their highest level of education; their employment status as unemployed; earning a higher income (more than \$78,000 per annum); and either voting for the Australian Labor Party or a minority party in the 2019 federal election (Table 5).

Figure 6. Satisfaction with the Australian government's management of China relations




Table 5. Impact of latent factors on satisfaction with the Australian government's management of China relations

	More satisfied	Less satisfied
State	-	Tasmania
Gender	-	-
Age	Younger (aged 18-46)	Older (aged 47+)
Location (Urban/rural)	-	-
Household type	Parent(s) with dependent children	-
Education (highest level)	-	Certificate/Trade/Diploma
Employment	-	Unemployed
Income	Lower income (<\$34,000 p.a.)	Higher income (>\$78,000 p.a.)
Voting behaviour in the 2019 federal election	Liberal/National	Australian Labor Party; Minority party



# 1.7 A harder Australian government line on China

Over half of Australians (58 percent) believe that the Australian government should take a harder line with respect to its policies dealing with China. This is a five-point decrease from 2021 (63 percent). Twenty-four percent express neutrality and 17 percent disagree (Figure 7).

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (67 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for the Australian Labor Party (53 percent) are less likely to agree.

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses agreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported occupying a younger age bracket (aged 18-46); either completing high school or a certificate/trade/diploma as their highest level of education; their employment status as full-time employed; and earning a lower income (less than \$34,000 per annum).

Latent factors that had the most significant impact on responses disagreeing with the sentiment were respondents who reported occupying an older age bracket (aged 47+); either completing a bachelor's degree or a postgraduate degree as their highest level of education; and their employment status as retired.

Figure 7. Support for a harder Australian government line on China




Table 6. Impact of latent factors on support for a harder Australian government line on China

	More supportive	Less supportive
State	-	-
Gender	-	-
Age	Younger (aged 18-46)	Older (aged 47+)
Location (Urban/rural)	-	-
Household type	-	-
Education (highest level)	High school; Certificate/Trade/Diploma	Bachelor's degree; Postgraduate degree
Employment	Full-time employed	Retired
Income	Lower income (<\$34,000 p.a.)	-
Voting behaviour in the 2019 federal election	-	-

# 1.8 Changing views


*‘My view of China has become more negative following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic’*

Six in 10 Australians (60 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (62 percent). Twenty-two percent express neutrality and 18 percent disagree (Figure 8).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (68 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (52 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 8. **Changing views of China following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic**

My view of China has become more negative following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic



# 1.9 Responsibility for improving the Australia-China relationship

## *‘The responsibility for improving the relationship between Australia and China lies with both countries’*

---

Seventy-eight percent of Australians agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (80 percent). Fifteen percent express neutrality and seven percent disagree (Figure 9).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (83 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (73 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (82 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (74 percent) are less likely to agree.

## *‘The responsibility for improving the relationship between Australia and China lies with Australia’*

---

Thirty-two percent of Australians agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (30 percent). Thirty-four percent express neutrality and thirty-four percent disagree (Figure 9).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (39 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians aged 55+ (27 percent) are less likely to agree. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (36 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.


## *‘The responsibility for improving the relationship between Australia and China lies with China’*

---

Forty-five percent of Australians agree. This is a three-point decrease from 2021 (48 percent). Thirty-three percent express neutrality and 22 percent disagree (Figure 9).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (49 percent) are more likely to agree. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (56 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (38 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 9. Responsibility for improving the Australia-China relationship



# 1.10 Future outlook

## *‘The Australia-China relationship will improve in the next three years’*


Twenty-eight percent of Australians agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (27 percent). Forty-two percent express neutrality and 31 percent disagree (Figure 10).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (34 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians aged 55+ (23 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A state/territory divide:** New South Wales residents (34 percent) are more likely to agree. Northern Territory residents (19 percent) are less likely to agree. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (32 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 10. **Improvement of the Australia-China relationship in the next three years**

The Australia-China relationship will improve in the next three years



# 2. Federal election 2022


# 2.1 Background

National security was established by the Coalition government as a major campaign issue leading up to the 2022 federal election, with China cast as the primary strategic challenge facing the nation.

Growing consternation about regional instability and uncertainty has been a focal point. Prime Minister Scott Morrison warned in a March 2022 speech: ‘We face the spectre of a transactional world, devoid of principle, accountability and transparency, where state sovereignty, territorial integrity and liberty are surrendered for respite from coercion and intimidation, or economic entrapment dressed up as economic reward’.<sup>6</sup>

While there is little in the way of substantive difference between the Coalition and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) on policies relating to national security and China,<sup>7</sup> significant effort has been made to depict the ALP as ‘weak’ in both areas, casting the opposition as Beijing’s preferred party.<sup>8</sup>

After initially exchanging recriminations,<sup>9</sup> the ALP has shifted to emphasising that bipartisanship continues on all matters of national security and foreign policy.<sup>10</sup> Asked what Labor’s ‘plan on China’ is, Shadow Foreign Minister Penny Wong said it would prioritise improving Australia’s military and diplomatic capabilities, as well as its economic resilience.<sup>11</sup> The Leader of the Opposition, Anthony Albanese, and his senior ministers underline that ‘China has changed’ and that ‘China’s responsible’ for the breakdown in relations, emphasising President Joe Biden’s approach to China relations as a guiding principle for Labor’s navigation of China relations: ‘competition without catastrophe needs to be the objective’.<sup>12</sup>




## 2.2 Political party best placed to handle Australia's China policy

*'Which political party is best placed to handle Australia's China policy?'*

Australians are effectively evenly split between nominating the Liberal/Nationals and the Australian Labor Party as the political party best placed to handle Australia's China policy. Thirty-six percent of Australians say the Coalition is best placed to handle Australia's China policy, while 35 percent selected the Australian Labor Party. Twenty-nine percent of Australians chose 'Other' (Figure 11).

Figure 11. **Political party best placed to handle Australia's China policy**

Which political party is best placed to handle Australia's China policy?




Coalition Australian Labor Party Other

*'Is the Australian government's management of China policy an issue that will have an impact on your vote in the next federal election?'*

Four in ten Australians (40 percent) state that the Australian government's management of China policy is an issue that will have an impact on their vote in the 2022 federal election. Thirty-one percent stated that it would not have an impact on their voting behaviour. Twenty-nine percent said they did not know (Figure 12).

Figure 12. **Australian government's management of China policy: Impact on vote in federal election**

Is the Australian government's management of China policy an issue that will have an impact on your vote in the next federal election?



Yes No Don't know



## 2.3 China policy: Impact on voting behaviour

### Box 1. Considerations of voters who say China policy will impact their ballot in the 2022 federal election

The Australians who said that China policy will have an impact on the way in which they vote this year generally express alarm, anxiety and apprehension about Australia-China relations in other areas of this survey. They are more likely to express:

- Overall concerns about Australia's relationship with China (81 percent); and
- Mistrust of the Chinese government (78 percent)

They are also more likely to agree with the following statements:

- 'The Chinese government is willing to use its trade and investment ties with Australia to punish Australia over political disagreements' (84 percent)
- 'Foreign interference stemming from China is a major problem' (81 percent)
- 'Australia is too economically reliant on China' (80 percent)
- 'Foreign interference in Australia stemming from China is more concerning than foreign interference from other countries' (78 percent)
- 'Australia should place sanctions, such as travel and financial bans, on Chinese officials and entities involved in human rights violations' (77 percent)
- 'The risk of arbitrary detention is a concern when considering travel to China' (77 percent)
- 'China's artificial island-building in the South China Sea is a threat to Australia's security' (77 percent)
- 'The Chinese government is monitoring the communications of Australians closely with apps such as WeChat' (74 percent)
- 'The Australian government's disputes with the Chinese government are better communicated through diplomatic channels rather than public statements' (72 percent)
- 'The Australian government should force Landbridge, the Chinese company that bought the 99-year lease to the Port of Darwin in 2015, to sell the port back to the government' (72 percent)
- 'My view of China has become more negative following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic' (70 percent)
- 'In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan, Australia should lend military support to the United States' (68 percent)
- 'The Australian government is right not to sign up to/participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative' (67 percent)
- 'Australia should form trade and security blocs with other countries that deliberately exclude China' (54 percent)
- 'Australians of Chinese origin can be mobilised by the Chinese government to undermine Australia's interests and social cohesion' (53 percent)

3.

# Political communication

# 3.1 Background

High-level dialogue between Australia and China remains non-existent.


Australian ministers have consistently pressed the point that the government stands ready to engage in dialogue with Beijing to navigate a way out of current tensions. However, Foreign Minister Marise Payne has noted that the country had been advised by China that ‘they will only engage in high-level dialogue if we meet certain conditions’.<sup>13</sup> With Beijing placing the onus on Australia to smooth relations and displaying a lack of interest in materially engaging or taking initiative otherwise,<sup>14</sup> the paralysis continues.

The Australian government announced it would not be sending any official representatives to the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022, citing Beijing’s unwillingness to meet with Australia to discuss a range of concerns.<sup>15</sup>

Australia’s early call for an independent, international investigation into the origins and spread of COVID-19, a move which heightened political friction with China, has been repeatedly highlighted by Prime Minister Scott Morrison and senior ministers during the 2022 election campaign.<sup>16</sup>

Diplomatic channels are also facing blockages. Australia’s Ambassador to China detailed the difficulties Australia’s diplomatic representatives in China were facing in candid remarks: ‘The kind of informal and more casual access that ambassadors would normally expect to have across the system is very difficult... at the moment.’<sup>17</sup>

A somewhat conciliatory tone was struck when the new Chinese Ambassador to Australia pledged upon his arrival in Canberra in January 2022 to ‘[work] with the Australian government and friends in all sectors to... jointly push the China-Australia relations[hip] back to the right track.’<sup>18</sup> Nonetheless, contrasting messages have continued to emanate from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.<sup>19</sup>



## 3.2 Communication over areas of disagreement


*'The Australian government should not publicly call out actions by the Chinese government that Australia disagrees with'*

Just over a quarter of Australians (27 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (28 percent). Twenty-five percent express neutrality and 48 percent disagree (Figure 13).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (38 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians aged 55+ (20 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 13. **Communication by the Australian government over areas of disagreement**

The Australian government should not publicly call out actions by the Chinese government that Australia disagrees with



*‘The Australian government’s disputes with the Chinese government are better communicated through diplomatic channels rather than public statements’*


About six in ten Australians (63 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (61 percent). Twenty-seven percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 14).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (70 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (57 percent) are less likely to agree.

**An urban/rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (52 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas.

Figure 14. **Support for the Australian government’s communication of disputes through diplomatic channels**

The Australian government’s disputes with the Chinese government are better communicated through diplomatic channels rather than public statements



# 3.3 Diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics

*'The Australian government was right to participate in a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022'*


Over half of Australians (58 percent) agree. Twenty-eight percent express neutrality and fourteen percent disagree (Figure 15).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (63 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (51 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (67 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (46 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 15. **Support for the Australian government's diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics**

The Australian government was right to participate in a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022



# 3.4 Call for an international COVID-19 investigation


*‘The Australian government was right to publicly call for an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19’*

Almost seven in 10 Australians (69 percent) agree. This is a three-point decrease from 2021 (72 percent). Twenty percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 16).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (77 percent) are more likely to agree compared with younger Australians. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (80 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for the Australian Labor Party (65 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 16. **Support for the Australian government’s call for a COVID-19 investigation**

The Australian government was right to publicly call for an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19



4.

# Military and security



# 4.1 Background

China's military modernisation, its rapid expansion of maritime, aerospace and territorial capabilities, the non-transparency of Beijing's intentions, and calculations on how Australia might best respond to threats emanating from China, have been a major driving force behind Australian defence planning.

A trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) was announced in September 2021, with its first major initiative being the roll-out of nuclear submarines in Australia using US or UK technology.<sup>20</sup><sup>21</sup> Details such as timeframe and cost have yet to be firmed up, with the countries committing themselves to identify an 'optimal pathway' within an 18-month period.<sup>22</sup> The partnership's focus has now extended to the development of hypersonic missiles.<sup>23</sup> Australia also signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, allowing for greater interoperability and cooperation between the Australian Defence Force and Japanese Self-Defence Forces.<sup>24</sup>

As Cross-Strait tensions rise, the prospect that Chinese aggression towards Taiwan could spark military conflict between Australian and Chinese forces has been emphasised by Defence Minister Peter Dutton. The minister has repeatedly telegraphed an Australian commitment to a US-led task force<sup>25</sup> - however, he has recently moderated this stance.<sup>26</sup>

The joint statement issued by Moscow and Beijing in February 2022<sup>27</sup> and China's refusal to condemn the invasion of Ukraine has led Australian intelligence to determine that 'a troubling new strategic convergence' between Russia and China has developed.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, Prime Minister Scott Morrison in a March 7 speech warned that a new 'arc of autocracy was emerging 'to challenge and reset the world order in their own image'.<sup>29</sup>

While Australia in the past has generally refrained from publicly attributing cyberattacks to a state actor, the government, in coordination with about 38 other countries, including the US, the UK, the European Union, Canada, Japan and New Zealand, opted to release a statement 'expressing serious concerns about malicious cyber activities by China's Ministry of State Security' in July 2021.<sup>30</sup>

Concerns about Chinese government interference in digital systems also arose with respect to WeChat, with calls by some Australian federal parliamentarians for their colleagues to boycott WeChat and for Australians 'to have a second think' about using the platform<sup>31</sup> after reports emerged that the Prime Minister had lost access to his Weixin account after it had undergone a transfer of ownership and rebranding.<sup>32</sup> There has been some mixed messaging on engagement with Chinese-owned applications - having warned in 2020 that 'the line connects right back in to China',<sup>33</sup> the Prime Minister opened a TikTok account in December 2021 to engage with the public.<sup>34</sup>


## 4.2 Security and stability

### *'China is a security threat to Australia'*

Seventy-three percent of Australians agree. This is a six-point increase from 2021 (67 percent). Eighteen percent express neutrality and nine percent disagree (Figure 17).

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (83 percent) are more likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (83 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 17. **China as a security threat**




*‘The Australian government is right to increase defence spending, to balance, among other considerations, China’s growing military might’*

Seven in 10 Australians (70 percent) agree. Twenty-two percent express neutrality and eight percent disagree (Figure 18).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (55 percent) are less likely to agree compared with older Australians. **A state/territory divide:** Victoria residents (75 percent) are more likely to agree. New South Wales residents (61 percent) are less likely to agree. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (85 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (58 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 18. **Support for an increase in Australia’s defence spending**

The Australian government is right to increase defence spending, to balance, among other considerations, China’s growing military might



*‘Australia should form trade and security blocs with other countries that deliberately exclude China’*

About four in ten Australians (41 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (43 percent). Thirty-three percent express neutrality and 26 percent disagree (Figure 19).


**A state/territory divide:** South Australia residents (54 percent) and New South Wales residents (48 percent) are more likely to agree. Northern Territory residents (29 percent) are less likely to agree.

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in large metropolitan areas (46 percent) are more likely to agree compared with those who reside in rural or small metropolitan areas.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (50 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree than those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 19. **Trade and security blocs**

Australia should form trade and security blocs with other countries that deliberately exclude China




*‘Australia’s relationship with China contributes to regional stability and security’*

Half of Australians (50 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (52 percent). Twenty-nine percent express neutrality and 21 percent disagree (Figure 20).

Figure 20. **Regional stability and security**

Australia’s relationship with China contributes to regional stability and security



## 4.3 Conflict over Taiwan

### *‘If China launches a military attack on Taiwan, Australia should send troops to go to Taiwan’s defence’*

About four in ten Australians (39 percent) agree. Twenty-seven percent express neutrality and 34 percent disagree (Figure 21).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (48 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians aged 55+ (30 percent) are less likely to agree. **A state/territory divide:** New South Wales residents (51 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

### *‘In the event of military conflict between United States and China over Taiwan, Australia should remain neutral’*

About four in 10 Australians (42 percent) agree. This is an 11-point decrease from 2021 (53 percent). Twenty-three percent express neutrality and 35 percent disagree (Figure 22).

### *‘In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan, Australia should lend military support to the United States’*

More than half of Australians (56 percent) agree. This is an 11-point increase from 2021 (45 percent). Twenty-five percent express neutrality and 20 percent disagree (Figure 22).

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for a minority party (41 percent) at the 2019 federal election are less likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 21. **Defence of Taiwan**

If China launches a military attack on Taiwan, Australia should send troops to go to Taiwan’s defence





Figure 22. Conflict over Taiwan between the US and China



## 4.3 Cybersecurity


*'The Australian government is right to publicly call out any Chinese state-sponsored cybersecurity attacks on Australia's digital systems'*

Just over eight in 10 Australians (81 percent) agree. Fourteen percent express neutrality and five percent disagree (Figure 23).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (93 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (72 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 23. **Publicly attributing Chinese state-sponsored cybersecurity attacks**

The Australian government is right to publicly call out any Chinese state-sponsored cybersecurity attacks on Australia's digital systems





*‘The Chinese government is monitoring the communications of Australians closely with apps such as WeChat’*


Sixty-eight percent of Australians agree. This is a five-point decrease from 2021 (73 percent). Twenty-six percent express neutrality and six percent disagree (Figure 24).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (78 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (60 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A state/territory divide:** Northern Territory residents (52 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

Figure 24. **Concerns about cyber surveillance**

The Chinese government is monitoring the communications of Australians closely with apps such as WeChat



*‘Australia should ban Chinese-owned apps such as TikTok and WeChat’*


Forty-seven percent of Australians agree. This is about a three point decrease from 2021 (50 percent). Twenty-eight percent express neutrality and 25 percent disagree (Figure 25).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (55 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (39 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (58 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 25. **Support for banning apps such as TikTok and WeChat**

Australia should ban Chinese-owned apps such as TikTok and WeChat



# 4.5 The Belt and Road Initiative


*‘The Australian government is right not to sign up to/participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative’*

Over half of Australians (57 percent) agree. This is a four-point increase from 2021 (53 percent). Thirty-five percent express neutrality and seven percent disagree (Figure 26).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (71 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (47 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (73 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (49 percent) and the Australian Labor Party (52 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 26. **The Belt and Road Initiative**




## 4.6 The South China Sea

*‘China’s artificial island-building in the South China Sea is a threat to Australia’s security’*

Sixty-four percent of Australians agree. This is a five-point increase from 2021 (59 percent). Twenty-four percent express neutrality and 12 percent disagree (Figure 27).

Figure 27. **The South China Sea**

China’s artificial island-building in the South China Sea is a threat to Australia’s security



# 5. The United States


# 5.1 Background

In the lead up to the 70th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty, White House coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, stated that ‘a deepening, intensifying relationship between Canberra and Washington’ had developed since President Joe Biden’s inauguration, precipitated by Beijing’s attempts to ‘cut Australia out of the herd, and to try to see if they can effect Australia to completely change how it both sees itself and sees the world’.<sup>35</sup>

Indeed, Australia and the US are in greater alignment on their approaches to China,<sup>36</sup> made distinct by Australia’s move away from the previously more cautious formulations on Australia’s China policy as compared with American China policy publicly relayed during the July 2020 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN).<sup>37</sup>

Australia has welcomed the clear expressions of support from Washington’ after its pledge that ‘the United States will not leave Australia alone on the field...in the face of economic coercion by China’. While there has been general discussion of Australia and the US ‘working together to find new approaches to economic diversification, supply chain security... and being able to overcome efforts at economic coercion’,<sup>38</sup> and while Washington has praised Canberra for having ‘set an incredibly powerful example’ for the world in its dealings with Beijing,<sup>39</sup> concrete initiatives on cooperation against economic coercion have not as yet been established. It was reported that when Trade Minister Dan Tehan put the proposal of an Annual Strategic Economic Dialogue between the countries to American officials, they were ‘non-committal’.<sup>40</sup>

In the defence realm, Australia and the US, along with the UK, entered into a trilateral security pact (AUKUS) in September 2021 to, among other aims, share nuclear submarine technology and facilitate Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines. US Congress formed a bipartisan AUKUS Working Group in April 2022.<sup>41</sup> (See also ‘Military and security: 4.1 Background’). President Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said the nuclear submarine announcement was a signal to allies and partners that if ‘you bet with us, we will bet with you.’<sup>42</sup>



## 5.2 Balancing Australia's relationships with the United States and China

*'Australia can enjoy a good relationship with both China and the United States at the same time'*

.....

About six in 10 Australians (61 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (63 percent). Twenty-one percent express neutrality and 19 percent disagree (Figure 28).

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (47 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas.

*'Australia's relationship with China weakens our alliance with the United States'*

.....

Australians are about as evenly split on this proposition this year as they were in 2021. About three in 10 Australians (31 percent) agree. Thirty-three percent express neutrality and 36 percent disagree (Figure 28).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (37 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians aged 55+ (22 percent) are less likely to agree.

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (40 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas.

*'The United States will eventually force Australia to choose between a close relationship with Washington or a close relationship with Beijing'*

.....


Forty-two percent of Australians agree. This is a three-point increase from 2021 (39 percent). Thirty percent express neutrality and 29 percent disagree (Figure 28).

*'China will eventually force Australia to choose between a close relationship with Beijing or a close relationship with Washington'*

.....

Almost half of Australians (46 percent) agree. This is a five-point decrease from 2021 (51 percent). Thirty-four percent express neutrality and 20 percent disagree (Figure 28).

Figure 28. Australia's relationships with the United States and China



● Agree ● Neutral ● Disagree




## 5.3 Influence in the region

*'China has more influence than the US in Australia's regional neighbourhood'*

Sixty-one percent of Australians agree. This is a four-point decrease from 2021 (65 percent). Twenty-eight percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 29).

Figure 29. **The United States and China's regional influence**

China has more influence than the US in Australia's regional neighbourhood



# 5.4 Economic punishment over political disagreements

*‘The United States government is willing to use its trade and investment ties with Australia to punish Australia over political disagreements’*

A third of Australians (33 percent) agree, a continuation of views expressed in 2021 (33 percent). Thirty-seven percent express neutrality and 30 percent disagree (Figure 30).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (41 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians aged 55+ (25 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for a minority party (37 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (25 percent) are less likely to agree.


*‘The Chinese government is willing to use its trade and investment ties with Australia to punish Australia over political disagreements’*

Almost three-quarters of Australians (74 percent) agree. This is a three-point decrease from 2021 (77 percent). Eighteen percent express neutrality and eight percent disagree (Figure 30).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (85 percent) are more likely to agree.

Younger Australians aged 18-34 (64 percent) are less likely to agree. **A state/territory divide:** Tasmania residents (88 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for a minority party (67 percent) are less likely to agree than those who voted for the two major political parties.

Figure 30. The United States and China’s willingness to mete out economic punishment over political disagreements



The United States government is willing to use its trade and investment ties with Australia to punish Australia over political disagreements

The Chinese government is willing to use its trade and investment ties with Australia to punish Australia over political disagreements

# 6. Trade and investment

## 6.1 Background

Sanctions on Australian exports imposed by Beijing, which were once described by Prime Minister Scott Morrison as ‘completely unconscionable’,<sup>43</sup> continue without reprieve. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson effectively confirmed that its economic relationship with Australia was being used as a means to communicate political dissatisfaction, saying, ‘We will not allow any country to reap benefits from doing business with China while groundlessly accusing and smearing China and undermining China’s core interests based on ideology’.<sup>44</sup>

Panels have been established at the World Trade Organization (WTO) to examine China’s imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imported barley<sup>45</sup> and wine<sup>46</sup> from Australia, as well as Australia’s imposition of duties on imported wind towers, stainless steel sinks and certain railway wheels<sup>47</sup> from China. In a statement to the WTO’s eighth periodic review of the trade policies and practices of China in October 2021,<sup>48</sup> Australia commended China for its economic achievements while criticising it for the trade disruptions it had directed at Australia.<sup>49</sup>

Australian government representatives are not optimistic about the short term prospects of finding a resolution to problems in the economic relationship. They have also flagged that there is scope for matters to worsen. Australia’s Ambassador to China observed last year, ‘I think everyone else is on notice that there are potential problems in the relationship that could affect our trading future.’<sup>50</sup>

As such, the Australian government has directed effort towards reducing Australian economic exposure to China through trade diversification, signing a free trade agreement with the UK in 2021 and working to push along a trade deal with India a decade in the making.<sup>51</sup> Australian businesses have been encouraged to adopt a ‘China plus’ strategy.<sup>52</sup> The government is also focused on garnering support from other countries against China’s economic punishment. This has been a complicated undertaking. Some rhetorical support has been forthcoming – the Quad grouping comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US in February for the first time expressed the group’s opposition to economic coercion in a joint leaders’ statement.<sup>53</sup>

Last year, two-way trade between Australia and China hit a record high – \$US183.4 billion, up 24 percent on 2020.<sup>54</sup> But this was mostly attributable to buoyant global resources and energy prices, notably iron ore. These remain well above historical averages but down from the first half of 2021. This means the total value of Australia’s exports to China will more than likely fall in 2022, particularly if the impasse affecting coal, wine and the like is not overcome.

China’s application to join the to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)<sup>55</sup> has been met with a lack of enthusiasm by Australia, its Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade markedly more supportive<sup>56</sup> of Taiwan’s accession.<sup>57</sup>

Foreign investment from China continues to fall. One study found that in 2021 Chinese investment in Australia declined from \$2.5 billion to \$0.6 billion.<sup>58</sup> One factor behind this is the elevation of security considerations in Australian appraisal of Chinese investment applications.<sup>59</sup> The lease of the Port of Darwin to Chinese company Landbridge was the subject of a review by the Australian Department of Defence, which found that there ‘were no national security grounds sufficient to recommend government intervention’.<sup>60</sup> While the Prime Minister has previously undertaken only to act on departmental advice with respect to the lease,<sup>61</sup> it remains a possibility for the government to annul the contract.

## 6.2 The economic relationship overall

### *‘Australia is too economically reliant on China’*

Seventy-four percent of Australians agree. This is a six-point decrease from 2021 (80 percent). Nineteen percent express neutrality and seven percent disagree (Figure 31).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (83 percent) are more likely to agree compared with younger Australians.

### *‘The Chinese government’s recent placement of trade restrictions on Australian exports is extremely worrying’*

Seventy-seven percent of Australians agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (78 percent). Seventeen percent express neutrality and seven percent disagree (Figure 31).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (86 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (63 percent) are less likely to agree. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (89 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (62 percent) are less likely to agree.

### *‘The Australian government has been successful in efforts to diversify trade, reducing Australia’s economic exposure to China’*

About four in ten Australians (42 percent) agree. Thirty-one percent express neutrality and 26 percent disagree. (Figure 31).

### *‘Without close economic engagement with China, Australia would not be as prosperous as it currently is’*

Six in ten Australians (60 percent) agree. This is a three-point decrease from 2021 (63 percent). Twenty-three percent express neutrality and 17 percent disagree (Figure 31).

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (72 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

### *‘Trade with China has created job opportunities in Australia’*

About six in 10 Australians (64 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (65 percent). Twenty-five percent express neutrality and 12 percent disagree (Figure 31).

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (44 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas.

*‘Australia’s economic relationship with China is more of an economic risk than an economic opportunity’*

---

About half of Australians (51 percent) agree, more or less a continuation of views expressed in 2021 (53 percent). Thirty-two percent express neutrality and 18 percent disagree (Figure 31).

**A state/territory divide:** New South Wales residents (57 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (57 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.


*‘The Australian government needs to be supportive of having closer economic ties with China’*

---

About half of Australians (51 percent) agree, more or less a continuation of views expressed in 2021 (49 percent). Thirty percent express neutrality and 20 percent disagree (Figure 31).

**A state/territory divide:** Queensland residents (43 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (35 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas.

Figure 31. Views on the Australia-China economic relationship overall




## 6.3 Trade agreements

*‘The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement has been beneficial for Australia’*

Nearly half of Australians (49 percent) agree. This is a three-point decrease from 2021 (52 percent). Thirty-six percent express neutrality and 15 percent disagree (Figure 32).

Figure 32. **The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA)**

The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement has been beneficial for Australia





*‘The Australian government should support China’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement which 11 countries, including Australia, signed in 2018’*


About three in 10 Australians (31 percent) agree. Forty-five percent express neutrality and 24 percent disagree (Figure 33).

*‘The Australian government should support Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement which 11 countries, including Australia, signed in 2018’*

Two-thirds of Australians (66 percent) agree. Twenty-seven percent express neutrality and eight percent disagree (Figure 33).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (76 percent) are more likely to agree compared with younger Australians.

Figure 33. **Expansion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)**



The Australian government should support China's bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement which 11 countries, including Australia, signed in 2018

The Australian government should support Taiwan's bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement which 11 countries, including Australia, signed in 2018

● Agree ● Neutral ● Disagree

# 6.4 Trade case study: Tourism

## *‘Tourists from China provide a major economic benefit to Australia’*

Seven in 10 Australians (70 percent) agree. This is a four-point decrease from 2021 (74 percent). Twenty percent express neutrality and 10 percent disagree (Figure 34).

**A state/territory divide:** Queensland residents (63 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (60 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (76 percent) and the Liberal/Nationals (75 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (62 percent) are less likely to agree.

## *‘Australia should continue towards making Australia an attractive destination for Chinese tourists’*

About six in 10 Australians (62 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (63 percent). Twenty-two percent express neutrality and 16 percent disagree (Figure 34).


**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (69 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (56 percent) are less likely to agree.

## *‘Encouraging tourism from China needs to be a post-COVID-19 priority for Australia’*

Slightly more than half of Australians (53 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (51 percent). Twenty-four percent express neutrality and 23 percent disagree (Figure 34).

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (45 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas.

Figure 34. Trade case study: Tourism



# 6.5 Trade case study: Education

## *‘International students from China provide a major economic benefit to Australia’*

Sixty-seven percent of Australians agree. This is a nine-point decrease from 2021 (76 percent). Twenty-two percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 35).

## *‘Australian universities are too financially reliant on international students from China’*

Three-quarters of Australians (75 percent) agree. This is a six-point decrease from 2021 (81 percent). Fourteen percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 35).


**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (88 percent) are more likely to agree compared with younger Australians. **A state/territory divide:** Tasmania residents (86 percent) are more likely to agree. Victoria residents (61 percent) are less likely to agree.

## *‘Encouraging international students from China to return to study in Australia needs to be a post-COVID-19 priority for Australia’*

Forty-six percent of Australians agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (45 percent). Thirty percent express neutrality and 25 percent disagree (Figure 35).

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (33 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (59 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (36 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 35. Trade case study: Education



# 6.6 Foreign investment

## *‘Foreign investment from China has created job opportunities in Australia’*

Just over half of Australians (53 percent) agree. This is a three-point increase from 2021 (50 percent). Thirty percent express neutrality and 18 percent disagree (Figure 36).

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (64 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

## *‘Foreign investment from China should be supported by Australians’*

Nearly a third of Australians (30 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (29 percent). Thirty-four percent express neutrality and 36 percent disagree (Figure 36).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (40 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians (22 percent) are less likely to agree. **A state/territory divide:** Tasmania residents (19 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.


## *‘Foreign investment from China is more detrimental than beneficial to Australia’*

Almost half of Australians (49 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (51 percent). Thirty-three percent express neutrality and 18 percent disagree (Figure 36).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (41 percent) are less likely to agree compared with older Australians. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (62 percent) are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 36. Views on foreign investment from China overall

● Agree ● Neutral ● Disagree



# 6.7 Investment case study: Port of Darwin

*'The Australian government should force Landbridge, the Chinese company that bought the 99-year lease to the Port of Darwin in 2015, to sell the port back to the government'*


Six in 10 Australians (60 percent) agree. Twenty-eight percent express neutrality and 13 percent disagree (Figure 37).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians (51 percent) are less likely to agree than older Australians.

● Agree ● Neutral ● Disagree

Figure 37. Investment case study:  
Port of Darwin

The Australian government should force Landbridge, the Chinese company that bought the 99-year lease to the Port of Darwin in 2015, to sell the port back to the government



## 6.8 Investment case study: Agriculture

*‘Chinese ownership of agricultural assets (e.g., land, food processing facilities) in Australia is more concerning than ownership by companies from other countries’*

Sixty-five percent of Australians agree, a continuation of views expressed in 2021 (65 percent). Twenty-three percent express neutrality and 12 percent disagree (Figure 38).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (74 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (59 percent) are less likely to agree. **A state/territory divide:** South Australia residents (54 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (75 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (56 percent) are less likely to agree.

*‘Chinese ownership of agricultural assets (e.g., land, food processing facilities) in Australia presents a threat to Australia’s food security’*

Almost seven in 10 Australians (69 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (70 percent). Twenty percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 38).


**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (65 percent) are less likely to agree compared with older Australians. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (77 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (62 percent) are less likely to agree.

*‘Chinese ownership of agricultural assets (e.g., land, food processing facilities) in Australia is more beneficial than detrimental to Australia’s interests’*

Nearly a third of Australians (30 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (29 percent). Twenty-eight percent express neutrality and 42 percent disagree (Figure 38).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (37 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians aged 55+ (22 percent) are less likely to agree. **An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (20 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (39 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 38. Investment case study: Agriculture



## 6.9 Investment case study: Residential real estate

*‘Chinese investment in Australian residential real estate brings a lot of benefits for Australians (e.g., construction, new dwellings, jobs)’*

A third of Australians (33 percent) agree, a continuation of views expressed in 2021 (33 percent). Twenty-seven percent express neutrality and 40 percent disagree (Figure 39).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (41 percent) are more likely to agree. Older Australians aged 55+ (24 percent) are less likely to agree. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (48 percent) in the last federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

*‘Foreign buyers from China drive up Australian housing prices’*

Seventy-nine percent of Australians agree. This is a three-point decrease from 2021 (82 percent). Fourteen percent express neutrality and seven percent disagree (Figure 39).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (86 percent) are more likely to agree compared with younger Australians.

*‘Chinese investors in Australian real estate have made it difficult for first home buyers in Australia to enter the market’*

About seven in 10 Australians (71 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (69 percent). Nineteen percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 39).

*‘Chinese investors have negatively affected the rental market for residential real estate in Australia’*

Nearly seven in 10 Australians (69 percent) agree, a continuation of views expressed in 2021 (69 percent). Nineteen percent express neutrality and 12 percent disagree (Figure 39).


*‘Australia should restrict the amount of investment in residential real estate that is permitted from Chinese investors’*

Eight in ten Australians (80 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (78 percent). Fourteen percent express neutrality and seven percent disagree (Figure 39).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (85 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (76 percent) are less likely to agree. **An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (72 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (90 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.



Figure 39. Investment case study: Residential real estate




# 6.10 Business ties

## *‘Australian companies should continue to pursue business opportunities with China’*

About six in 10 Australians (61 percent) agree, a continuation of views expressed in 2021 (61 percent). Twenty-five percent express neutrality and 14 percent disagree (Figure 40).

**Figure 40. Support for business ties**

Australian companies should continue to pursue business opportunities with China



● Agree ● Neutral ● Disagree

## *‘Australia should not do business with China because of their record on human rights’*

Almost half of Australians (49 percent) agree. This is a six-point increase from 2021 (43 percent). Twenty-eight percent express neutrality and 24 percent disagree (Figure 41).

**A state/territory divide:** Queensland residents (59 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

## *‘Australia should not do business with China because of their domestic censorship of media, internet and other forms of communication’*


About four in 10 Australians (42 percent) agree, a continuation of views from 2021 (42 percent). Twenty-eight percent express neutrality and 30 percent disagree (Figure 41).

## *‘Australia should not do business with China because of their record on environmental practices’*


Over a third of Australians (36 percent) agree. This is a four point increase from 2021 (32 percent). Thirty-five percent express neutrality and 30 percent disagree (Figure 41).

**A state/territory divide:** South Australia residents (27 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

Figure 41. Concerns about business ties



# 7. Society



# 7.1 Background


Australia's susceptibility to foreign interference orchestrated by the Chinese government was promoted as a key concern by the Coalition government in the lead-up to the 2022 federal election. Both major parties subsequently levelled charges at the other of having been effectively compromised in some fashion.<sup>62</sup>

Delivering the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Director-General's annual threat assessment in February 2022, the ASIO Director-General said that 'espionage and foreign interference has supplanted terrorism as our principal security concern,' with the threat being 'pervasive and multifaceted'.<sup>63</sup> The Director-General emphasised that espionage and foreign interference threats originated from multiple countries. However, in detailing a recent operation undertaken by ASIO which 'detected and disrupted a foreign interference plot in the lead-up to an election in Australia', the focus was squarely on China. While the Director-General did not identify the country involved, Nine newspapers subsequently reported that 'multiple security sources who are not authorised to speak publicly have confirmed... that a Chinese intelligence service was behind the plot'.<sup>64</sup>

In the same month, Australia's Racial Discrimination Commissioner expressed concern over 'ongoing impact of racism and discrimination' against the Australian-Chinese community, saying that '[a]ny debates over Australia's foreign policy must ensure clear separation of issues of national interest and security from narratives that may result in demonization or vilification of particular Australian communities.'<sup>65</sup>

The Australian government's travel advisory for China continues to advise that 'Australians may be at risk of arbitrary detention', noting that '[Chinese] authorities have detained foreigners on grounds of 'endangering national security''.<sup>66</sup> Australian citizens Cheng Lei and Yang Hengjun, arrested on these grounds, continue to be held in detention in Beijing. Ms Cheng, first detained in August 2020, was tried on charges of supplying state secrets in March 2022, with the court's verdict deferred. Mr Yang, first detained in January 2019, was tried on charges of espionage in May 2021, with the verdict remaining postponed. The Australian government has characterised his case as 'an instance of arbitrary detention'.<sup>67</sup>

Coordinated sanctions in 2021 by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States over human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, was welcomed at the time by Australia.<sup>68</sup> In December 2022 Australia expanded its sanctions legislation 'to enable the establishment of Magnitsky-style and other thematic sanctions' which will allow Australia 'to sanction individuals and entities responsible for, or complicit in, egregious conduct, including malicious cyber activity, serious human rights abuses and violations, and serious corruption' both independently and 'with like-minded partners'.<sup>69</sup>



# 7.2 The Australian-Chinese community


*‘Political tensions in the Australia-China relationship are negatively impacting Australians of Chinese origin’*

Fifty-nine percent of Australians agree. This is a four-point decrease from 2021 (63 percent). Twenty-six percent express neutrality and 14 percent disagree (Figure 42).

**A state/territory divide:** Australian Capital Territory residents (74 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (68 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree than those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 42. Impact of political tensions on the Australian-Chinese community

Political tensions in the Australia-China relationship are negatively impacting Australians of Chinese origin



*‘Australians of Chinese origin can be mobilised by the Chinese government to undermine Australia’s interests and social cohesion’*

Forty-two percent of Australians agree. This a three-point increase from 2021 (39 percent). Thirty-one percent express neutrality and 27 percent disagree (Figure 43).


**A state/territory divide:** Tasmania residents (33 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (51 percent) are more likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas. Those who reside in small metropolitan areas (37 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (50 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree compared with those who voted for other political parties.

Figure 43. **Perceptions of Chinese government influence on the Australian-Chinese community**

Australians of Chinese origin can be mobilised by the Chinese government to undermine Australia’s interests and social cohesion



## 7.3 Interference and influence

### *‘Foreign interference in Australia stemming from China is more concerning than foreign interference from other countries’*

Sixty-seven percent of Australians agree. Twenty percent express neutrality and 13 percent disagree (Figure 44).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (77 percent) are more likely to agree compared with younger Australians. **A state/territory divide:** South Australia residents (76 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (78 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (55 percent) are less likely to agree.


### *‘Foreign interference in Australia stemming from China is a major problem’*

Sixty-nine percent of Australians agree. This is a three-point decrease from 2021 (72 percent). Twenty-three percent express neutrality and eight percent disagree (Figure 45).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ are more likely to agree (76 percent). Younger Australians aged 18-34 (62 percent) are less likely to agree. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (81 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (55 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 44. **Foreign interference stemming from China**

Foreign interference stemming from China is more concerning than foreign interference from other countries



### *‘Foreign interference in Australia stemming from the United States is a major problem’*


Nearly four in 10 Australians (39 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (37 percent). Thirty-two percent express neutrality and 29 percent disagree (Figure 45). **A state/territory divide:** New South Wales residents (50 percent) are more likely to agree. Queensland residents (30 percent) are less likely to agree.

### *‘Foreign interference in Australia stemming from Russia is a major problem’*

Sixty-five percent of Australians agree. This is an 18-point increase from 2021 (47 percent). Twenty-three percent express neutrality and 12 percent disagree (Figure 45).



Figure 45. Foreign interference – Country comparisons



*‘The Australian government is successfully responding to Chinese government interference in Australia’*


Nearly a third of Australians (31 percent) agree. This is a four-point decrease from 2021 (35 percent). Thirty-seven percent express neutrality and 33 percent disagree (Figure 46).

**A state/territory divide:** New South Wales residents (40 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (42 percent) at the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (20 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 46. **The Australian government’s response to Chinese government interference in Australia**

The Australian government is successfully responding to Chinese government interference in Australia




*‘Australian values and traditions are being undermined by Chinese government influence in Australia’*

Nearly half of Australians (48 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (46 percent). Twenty-six percent express neutrality and 26 percent disagree (Figure 47).

**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Liberal/Nationals (55 percent) are more likely to agree. Those who voted for the Australian Labor Party (44 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 47. **Perceptions of the impact of Chinese government influence on Australian values and traditions**

Australian values and traditions are being undermined by Chinese government influence in Australia



# 7.4 Sanctions legislation


*‘Australia should place sanctions, such as travel and financial bans, on Chinese officials and entities involved in human rights violations’*

Sixty-five percent of Australians agree. Twenty-four percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 48).

● Agree ● Neutral ● Disagree

Figure 48. **Support for the use of sanctions legislation**

Australia should place sanctions, such as travel and financial bans, on Chinese officials and entities involved in human rights violations



# 7.5 Arbitrary detention

*‘The risk of arbitrary detention is a concern when considering travel to China’*

About two-thirds of Australians (66 percent) agree. This is a six-point decrease from 2021 (72 percent). Twenty-one percent express neutrality and 13 percent disagree (Figure 49).

**An age divide:** Younger Australians aged 18-34 (59 percent) are less likely to agree compared with older Australians.


*‘China is willing to detain/arrest Australian citizens without any legal basis to punish Australia over political disagreements’*

Sixty-five percent of Australians agree, a general continuation of views from 2021 (68 percent). Twenty-three percent express neutrality and 12 percent disagree (Figure 49).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (75 percent) are more likely to agree. Younger Australians aged 18-34 (58 percent) are less likely to agree.

**A state/territory divide:** South Australia residents (79 percent) are more likely to agree. New South Wales residents (59 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 49. Arbitrary detention



## 7.6 International students

*‘International students from China help strengthen the people-to-people links between the two countries’*

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Over half of Australians (54 percent) agree. This is a four-point decrease from 2021 (58 percent). Thirty percent express neutrality and 16 percent disagree (Figure 50).

**A state/territory divide:** Victoria residents (41 percent) are less likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

*‘International students from China are potentially reducing the quality of education at Australian universities’*

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Nearly one-third of Australians (32 percent) agree. This is an eight-point decrease from 2021 (40 percent). Thirty-two percent express neutrality and 36 percent disagree (Figure 50).


*‘International students from China mean there are less places for domestic students to study in their choice of Australian university’*

---

About four in 10 Australians (42 percent) agree, a continuation of views from 2021 (42 percent). Twenty-nine percent express neutrality and 29 percent disagree (Figure 50).

**A state/territory divide:** New South Wales residents (62 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

Figure 50. **Views on international students**



# 8. University and research




# 8.1 Background

Government concern around foreign interference stemming from China continues to grow. This is especially the case in the higher education and research sector, whose processes and projects have come under intensified scrutiny, as well as research collaboration involving Chinese partners that deals with military or dual-use technologies. A report by the Australian government’s Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security on national security risks affecting the Australian higher education and research sector released in March 2022 notes that the university sector ‘must move from a benign operating environment for our adversaries to a hardened environment’ and that the sector, in tandem with the government, ‘should create an environment where hostile activity is unfeasible, too expensive or too risky to undertake.’<sup>70</sup>

The report’s recommendations for additional regulation of the sector builds on a series of moves, most recently updates to the Australian government’s guidelines to counter foreign interference in the university sector in November 2021.<sup>71</sup> While the guidelines are presented as ‘country agnostic’, a number of measures are specific responses to activities undertaken by Beijing, as some officials have effectively noted.<sup>72</sup> These include encroachments into the academic freedom of staff and students at universities, at times through intimidatory tactics.<sup>73</sup>

As protective measures continue to be refined and tightened, academic research collaboration between Australia and China is decreasing, with significant drops in partnerships in Australian Research Council grant schemes serving as one quantitative indicator.<sup>74</sup> The Australia-China science and technology relationship, a diplomatic bridge of sorts between the countries since the signing of an agreement on cooperation in 1980,<sup>75 76</sup> is under particular strain. For example, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) in early June 2021 did not renew a climate research partnership with the Qingdao National Marine Laboratory<sup>77</sup> following an observation by the head of the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) that ocean temperature modelling could assist submarine operations against Australia.<sup>78</sup> Heightened sensitivities have also extended to the humanities, with government interventions in December last year to veto peer-reviewed ARC grants for China-related humanities projects.<sup>79</sup>




## 8.2 Freedom of academic speech

### *'Australian university ties with China compromise Australian freedom of speech'*

Half of Australians (50 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (48 percent). Twenty-six percent express neutrality and 24 percent disagree (Figure 51).

Figure 51. **Freedom of academic speech**

Australian university ties with China compromise Australian freedom of speech



# 8.3 Research collaborations


*‘Academics from Australia should continue to partner with academics from China to undertake research projects’*

About six in 10 Australians (61 percent) agree. Twenty-five percent express neutrality and 15 percent disagree (Figure 52).

*‘Research collaborations between academics from Australia and China makes Australia more competitive internationally’*

Almost half of Australians (49 percent) agree, a general continuation of views expressed in 2021 (48 percent). Thirty-nine percent express neutrality and 12 percent disagree (Figure 52).

Figure 52. Research collaboration (general)



*‘It is beneficial for Australian scientists to have research connections to China’*

About six in 10 Australians (63 percent) agree. This is a five-point decrease from 2021 (68 percent). Twenty-three percent express neutrality and 14 percent disagree (Figure 53).


**A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (75 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (53 percent) are less likely to agree.

*‘Australian scientists working with Chinese scientists is beneficial for Australia’*

Nearly seven in 10 Australians (69 percent) agree. This is a five-point increase from 2021 (64 percent). Twenty percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 53).

**An age divide:** Australians aged 35-55 (64 percent) are less likely to agree compared with younger and older Australians. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (83 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (61 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 53. **Research collaboration (Science)**



# 9. Global and regional cooperation

# 9.1 Background

Despite Australia's continuing emphasis on 'cooperat[ing] where we are able to' and 'seek[ing] engagement and a very constructive approach'<sup>80</sup> with China, the freeze in political bilateral relations between them has had a marked impact on areas of collaboration and cooperation.

This is not to say it has ground to a halt. Australia's National Foundation for Australia China Relations grants program is supportive of 'fostering constructive engagement and cooperation between Australia and China on environmental management, climate change and the transition to low emissions technologies.'<sup>81</sup> The \$60 million Global Science and Technology Diplomacy Fund,<sup>82</sup> introduced in the 2021/2022 budget, which consolidates international science and technology programs, continues to support the collaboration in science, research and innovation between Australia and China. However, there is less of an emphasis on research collaboration with China as compared with other partner countries, especially within priority fields such as advanced manufacturing, AI and quantum computing, hydrogen production and RNA vaccines and therapies.<sup>83</sup>

Opportunities for cooperation within newly established multilateral architecture also exist. Last year the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in swift succession upgraded both its relationship with Australia<sup>84</sup> and with China<sup>85</sup> to a comprehensive strategic partnership. In January this year, the world's largest free trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), comprising 15 countries including Australia and China, entered into force.<sup>86</sup>

The US and China have shown it is possible to forge some common ground amidst competition, having announced at the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow a commitment to increasing climate cooperation 'through their respective accelerated actions... as well as through cooperation in multilateral processes, including the UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] process'.<sup>87</sup> This builds on a joint commitment enunciated earlier that year to tackle the global climate crisis.<sup>88</sup>

## 9.2 Global and regional cooperation

*'It is beneficial for Australia to work with China on global issues, such as climate change and global health'*

Sixty-nine percent of Australians agree. This is a five-point decrease from 2021 (74 percent). Twenty percent express neutrality and 11 percent disagree (Figure 54).

**A state/territory divide:** Western Australia residents (81 percent) and Australian Capital Territory residents (78 percent) are more likely to agree compared with residents in other Australian states and territories.

**An urban-rural divide:** Australians who reside in rural areas (55 percent) are less likely to agree compared with those who reside in small or large metropolitan areas. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (82 percent) in the 2019


federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (59 percent) are less likely to agree.

*'It is beneficial for Australia to work with China on regional issues, such as ending malaria in the Pacific'*


Seventy-two percent of Australians agree, a continuation of views from 2021 (72 percent). Eighteen percent express neutrality and 10 percent disagree (Figure 54).

**An age divide:** Older Australians aged 55+ (79 percent) are more likely to agree compared with younger Australians. **A political divide:** Australians who voted for the Australian Labor Party (81 percent) in the 2019 federal election are more likely to agree. Those who voted for a minority party (67 percent) are less likely to agree.

Figure 54. Benefits of global and regional cooperation



# Methodology





## Sample

Responses were collected via an online survey with participants recruited via a commercial panel, the Online Research Unit (ORU). Responses were collected from Australian adults across all Australian states and territories with Australian Census-based quotas applied to age and gender. State quotas were set at obtaining a minimum of 200 responses from Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, Western Australia, and South Australia, a minimum of 300 from Victoria and Queensland, and 400 from New South Wales. The total sample size consisted of 2000 complete responses. Responses were collected between March 18 2022 and March 30 2022. The median response time was 18.9 minutes.

## Instrument

The survey consisted of several parts:

1. Respondents were first provided background information and an invitation to participate.
2. Screening questions were performed on age, gender and location.
3. Respondents then provided their level of agreement in relation to their concerns and benefits of the Australia-China relationship and support overall. Responses were gathered using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 'Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree'.
4. An introductory task on ice-cream flavours was undertaken to familiarise respondents with the best-worst scaling task.
5. A best-worst scaling task was undertaken where respondents indicated the area of most concern in relation to the Australia-China relationship spanning 35 different areas.
6. Respondents were then asked to indicate their level of perceived level of agreement (on a seven-point Likert scale) about their concerns, benefits, or perceptions on specific dimensions of the Australia-China relationship. Respondents were randomly allocated to complete three to six questions relating to six out of 19 areas surveyed.


7. Respondents then completed sociodemographic questions relating to their household type, education, employment status, income, voting behaviour, political orientation, and ethnicity.
8. Respondents were then given the opportunity to provide open-ended feedback on any dimension of the Australia-China relationship.
9. Respondents then provided feedback about the survey on various dimensions such as difficulty and enjoyment.
10. Respondents were then returned back to the survey panel company's website to received credit for their completion.

Note: The poll instrument advised respondents that 'China' used throughout the poll referred to the People's Republic of China (PRC).

## Analysis

Questions relating to the concerns, benefits and overall views were analysed using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis followed by structural equation modelling. Reflective scales relating to latent dimension were evaluated in terms of reliability and discriminant validity with all factor scores being above a benchmark of .707. The resulting Average Variance Extracted (AVE) exceed 0.5 in all cases to establish convergent validity, whilst the resulting Cronbach Alpha's exceed 0.75 and Composite Reliabilities all exceeded .78 to establish reliability. Discriminant validity was established by confirming the AVE exceeded the corresponding squared correlation between latent scores. The structural model relating concerns and benefits to overall support had a norm fit index of .961 above the acceptable benchmark of .9 to indicate incremental fit, with a standardised root mean square residual of 0.026, significantly below the suggested benchmark of .08.

# About



# About the authors



## Elena Collinson

Elena Collinson is Senior Project and Research Officer at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI).

Elena is the inaugural lead of the UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll. She is editor of UTS:ACRI's commentary series, *Perspectives*. Her work and commentary have been published in numerous domestic and international media outlets and policy forums. She is a lawyer admitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales and has previously held research and project positions in Australian departmental, ministerial and Senate offices, at state and federal levels.

 @elenacollinson



## Professor Paul F. Burke

Dr Paul F. Burke is Deputy Director of the BIDA and Professor in Marketing at the University of Technology Sydney.

He is a leading expert in the field of applied market research, particularly quantitative methods utilizing experimental design, choice modelling, and best-worst scaling.

Dr Burke designs primary research projects using experimental design techniques and innovative survey approaches, such as best-worst scaling, as well as standard methods integrating hybrid choice, structural equation modelling (for attitudinal models), cluster and discriminant analysis (for segmentation), and regression analysis (e.g., probit). His work models consumer and human behaviour, including applications to product and service evaluation, social well-being and forecasting, with numerous projects involving mix-methods including those in health and well-being, education, employee, stakeholder and community preferences, and issues around rural and remote workforce participation.

 @drpaulburke

# About the Australia-China Relations Institute

The Australia-China Relations Institute (UTS:ACRI) is an independent, non-partisan research institute established in 2014 by the University of Technology Sydney. Chinese studies centres exist in other Australian universities. UTS:ACRI, however, is Australia's first and only research institute devoted to studying the relationship of these countries. UTS:ACRI seeks to inform Australia's engagement with China through research, analysis and dialogue grounded in scholarly rigour.

[australiachinarelations.org](http://australiachinarelations.org)



# About the Centre for Business Intelligence & Data Analytics

The Centre for Business Intelligence & Data Analytics (BIDA) is represented by a dynamic team of researchers working on multiple ARC and industry projects in areas such as transport, energy, labour, environmental and health economics.


The primary focus of the Centre is to model individual or organisational decision processes via revealed preference data or stated choice experiments. The rationale for this type of research is to investigate why people or (community) organisations choose a product, a service or a project over another. Individuals can express their preferences and choices in specific situations; however, it is not always straightforward to say why they make that specific choice.

Choice modelling techniques explore the factors driving the choice in both real and hypothetical settings (revealed and stated experiments respectively). Understanding the antecedents of the choice may support public, private and community organisations' decision-making strategies. Furthermore, choice models can be used for planning the best product, project or service suggesting which characteristics really matters to the users. In addition, it is possible to predict the demand of the new product, project or service that is not available on the market yet, supporting organisations to make better business decisions and to create effective policies based on what people value.


Examples of recent engagement and research include working with the NSW Government on which projects to fund in regional areas, investigating citizens' preferences and an analysis of the NSW labour market in order to understand the drivers within the market to be used to better address school leavers to the right career path.

# Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Amy Ma, Communications Officer at UTS:ACRI, for assisting with project planning and proof-reading, Corey Lee Bell, Project and Research Officer at UTS:ACRI, for proof-reading, and John Car for work on the report's graphic design.



# Appendix



# 1. Overall views on the Australia-China relationship

Table 1A Support for Australia building stronger connections and ties, having a strong relationship with China (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australia should try to build strong connections with China	2022	3.7	5.0	7.7	23.0	29.6	23.2	8.0
	2021	4.5	4.8	7.1	21.5	27.6	27.2	7.2
Australia should build strong ties with China	2022	3.9	5.5	8.3	25.4	27.6	21.6	7.8
	2021	4.8	5.5	7.9	24.2	28.1	22.5	7.0
Australia should have a strong relationship with China	2022	3.3	5.0	7.3	22.2	29.0	25.4	8.0
	2021	4.0	4.5	6.9	21.3	28.3	27.3	7.7
<b>2022 AVERAGE</b>		<b>3.6</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>23.5</b>	<b>28.7</b>	<b>23.4</b>	<b>7.9</b>

Table 2A Predictors of support for Australia building stronger connections and ties, having a strong relationship with China

	Impact on support overall	Importance (%)
Benefits of Australia's relationship with China	0.621	<b>49.92</b>
Concerns about Australia's relationship with China	0.122	<b>9.81</b>
Satisfaction with the Australian government's management of relations	-0.03	<b>2.41</b>
Belief that a harder line should be taken by the Australian government	-0.22	<b>17.68</b>
Mistrust of the Chinese government	-0.251	<b>20.18</b>



Table 3A Concerns about Australia's relationship with China (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I am concerned about Australia's relationship with China	2022	1.5	1.9	5.2	15.8	30.7	26.7	18.4
	2021	0.7	2.5	3.8	15.5	28.9	31.1	17.5
I am very apprehensive about the nature of Australia's relationship with China	2022	1.2	2.8	6.5	21.7	30.1	22.6	15.3
	2021	0.8	3.2	5.5	22.8	29.9	23.9	13.9
I am worried about how Australia and China interact with each other in a number of areas	2022	1.3	2.1	4.5	16.8	29.9	29.5	15.9
	2021	1.0	1.5	3.8	13.9	30.3	32.5	16.9
I hold a lot of concerns about the Australia-China bilateral relationship	2022	1.3	2.3	4.7	18.1	29.7	27.2	16.7
	2021	0.8	2.6	4.4	20.2	28.7	29.6	13.8
<b>2022 AVERAGE</b>		<b>1.3</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>18.1</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>16.6</b>

Table 4A Benefits of Australia's relationship with China (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
It is very beneficial for Australia to have a working relationship with China	2022	3.5	4.0	4.8	15.1	26.7	30.7	15.2
	2021	3.1	3.5	4.3	15.7	23.9	32.4	17.1
I believe the nature of Australia's relationship with China is of great value for Australia	2022	4.8	6.3	9.8	22.3	27.3	21.9	7.7
	2021	4.2	6.8	7.9	19.5	28.3	25.3	8.1
I believe how Australia and China interact with each other in a number of areas provides many benefits for Australia	2022	3.2	5.8	8.0	22.9	29.1	23.4	7.6
	2021	3.7	4.9	6.5	20.9	29.1	27.1	7.8
Australia's relationship with China is positive for Australia	2022	6.0	9.3	13.3	27.3	23.7	16.0	4.3
	2021	5.7	10.3	11.9	23.2	27.1	16.8	5.1
<b>2022 AVERAGE</b>		<b>4.4</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>21.9</b>	<b>26.7</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>8.7</b>

Table 5A **Mistrust of the Chinese government (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I have a lot of mistrust towards the Chinese government in its dealings with Australia	2022	1.6	3.2	5.9	16.7	24.6	22.1	26.0
	2021	1.6	2.8	4.3	16.0	23.5	26.1	25.7
The Chinese government cannot be trusted in its dealings with Australia	2022	1.9	3.0	5.7	19.9	26.2	21.1	22.2
	2021	1.2	3.1	5.5	19.3	23.4	21.9	25.6
It is difficult to believe the Chinese government when it comes to its dealings with Australia	2022	1.6	3.0	5.9	17.3	22.7	25.9	23.6
	2021	1.0	2.2	4.0	15.4	24.6	27.2	25.7
I am sceptical of the Chinese government when it comes to its dealings with Australia	2022	1.6	2.4	3.9	15.9	25.3	25.6	25.3
	2021	0.8	1.5	4.0	14.1	24.1	28.6	27.0
The Australian government should be suspicious of the Chinese government when it comes to having dealings with them	2022	1.3	2.6	4.5	16.3	27.2	23.9	24.2
	2021	0.9	2.2	4.7	15.7	25.1	25.6	25.7
<b>2022 AVERAGE</b>		<b>1.6</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>17.2</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>24.2</b>

Table 6A **Satisfaction with the Australian government's management of China relations (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government is managing Australia's relationship with China well	2022	10.8	14.2	17.9	24.9	18.1	11.1	3.1
	2021	9.0	14.7	19.8	25.9	17.3	10.1	3.3
I believe the Australian government is doing a good job in managing Australia's relationship with China	2022	10.5	13.5	18.6	22.9	18.7	12.3	3.6
	2021	8.1	14.0	19.6	24.0	19.4	11.5	3.5
I am satisfied with the Australian government's management of Australia's relationship with China	2022	10.9	13.7	18.1	23.8	18.3	11.2	4.1
	2021	8.1	15.3	19.7	25.0	17.2	11.4	3.3
<b>2022 AVERAGE</b>		<b>10.7</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>18.4</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>3.6</b>

Table 7A Support for a harder Australian government line on China (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I believe the Australian government should take a harder line with respect to its relationship with China	2022	3.6	5.4	10.0	25.0	23.9	19.8	12.4
	2021	2.0	4.6	7.7	23.4	26.3	19.0	17.1
I believe the Australian government should take a harder line with respect to its policies dealing with China	2022	3.0	4.9	7.7	23.9	26.9	20.1	13.7
	2021	1.9	3.9	7.3	22.1	25.4	21.6	17.8
Australia should be harder when it comes to dealing with China	2022	3.0	5.4	9.5	23.8	25.3	19.7	13.4
	2021	2.2	4.7	8.2	23.5	24.5	20.0	17.0
<b>2022 AVERAGE</b>		<b>3.2</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>24.2</b>	<b>25.4</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>13.2</b>

Table 8A Changing views of China following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
My view of China has become more negative following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic	2022	3.7	7.6	6.7	21.6	19.3	20.8	20.3
	2021	4.7	7.6	8.0	17.5	20.1	20.5	21.7

Table 9A Responsibility for improving the Australia-China relationship (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The responsibility for improving the relationship between Australia and China lies with both countries	2022	1.6	1.8	3.9	15.2	19.2	32.8	25.7
	2021	1.9	2.2	2.8	13.6	21.2	32.7	25.6
The responsibility for improving the relationship between Australia and China lies with Australia	2022	6.0	12.6	15.7	34.2	18.7	9.4	3.5
	2021	7.8	14.3	15.3	32.6	18.2	8.4	3.4
The responsibility for improving the relationship between Australia and China lies with China	2022	2.8	7.8	11.7	32.7	22.1	14.6	8.5
	2021	3.0	9.1	10.8	29.4	23.1	15.2	9.4

Table 10A Improvement of the Australia-China relationship in the next three years (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australia-China relationship will improve in the next three years	2022	5.6	9.8	15.4	41.8	16.5	9.0	2.1
	2021	5.2	10.2	14.6	42.6	17.2	8.8	1.5

# 2. Federal election 2022

Table 11A Political party best placed to handle Australia’s China policy (%)

	Coalition	Australian Labor Party	Other
Which political party is best placed to handle Australia’s China policy?	35.6	35.4	29.1

Table 12A Australian government’s management of China policy: Impact on vote in federal election (%)

	Yes	No	Don’t know
Is the Australian government’s management of China policy an issue that will have an impact on your vote in the next federal election?	40.1	30.9	29.0

### 3. Political communication

Table 13A Communication by the Australian government over areas of disagreement (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government should not publicly call out actions by the Chinese government that Australia disagrees with	2022	13.7	17.9	16.2	25.1	14.7	8.2	4.2
	2021	16.9	15.9	17.7	21.9	14.9	8.9	3.7

Table 14A Support for the Australian government's communication of disputes through diplomatic channels (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government's disputes with the Chinese government are better communicated through diplomatic channels rather than public statements	2022	2.5	4.2	3.8	26.8	22.8	24.9	14.8
	2021	2.8	5.4	6.0	25.1	20.6	25.4	14.6

Table 15A Support for the Australian government's diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government was right to participate in a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022	2022	3.4	4.4	6.5	28.1	17.1	24.1	16.5

Table 16A Support for the Australian government's call for a COVID-19 investigation (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government was right to publicly call for an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19	2022	2.5	3.2	5.3	20.2	22.9	20.2	25.7
	2021	2.6	3.1	6.5	15.4	19.3	21.3	31.9

## 4. Military and security

Table 17A China as a security threat (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
China is a security threat to Australia	2022	0.4	2.3	6.6	18.1	25.5	25.5	21.6
	2021	1.9	3.7	7.4	20.4	14.8	20.4	31.5

Table 18A Support for an increase in Australia's defence spending (%)

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government is right to increase defence spending, to balance, among other considerations, China's growing military might	3.1	1.9	3.4	21.8	27.2	22.2	20.3

Table 19A Trade and security blocs (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australia should form trade and security blocs with other countries that deliberately exclude China	2022	4.1	7.5	14.9	32.9	18.2	12.6	9.9
	2021	3.4	10.0	12.4	30.8	18.9	12.1	12.3

Table 20A Regional stability and security (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australia's relationship with China contributes to regional stability and security	2022	3.5	8.1	9.3	29.1	22.5	21.3	6.2
	2021	3.7	1.9	16.7	25.9	27.8	16.7	7.4

Table 21A **Defence of Taiwan (%)**

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
If China launches a military attack on Taiwan, Australia should send troops to go to Taiwan's defence	8.1	12.0	13.6	27.1	16.3	16.7	6.2

Table 22A **Conflict over Taiwan between the US and China (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
In the event of conflict between US and China over Taiwan, Australia should remain neutral	2022	8.9	11.2	15.1	22.9	19.8	10.9	11.2
	2021	3.6	3.6	10.9	29.1	27.3	18.2	7.3
In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan, Australia should lend military support to the United States	2022	5.1	5.4	8.9	24.5	23.7	19.1	13.2
	2021	5.4	5.4	1.8	42.9	12.5	19.6	12.5

Table 23A **Publicly attributing Chinese state-sponsored cybersecurity attacks (%)**

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government is right to publicly call out any Chinese state-sponsored cybersecurity attacks on Australia's digital systems	0.5	1.6	3.0	13.8	15.1	26.2	39.7



Table 24A Concerns about cyber surveillance (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Chinese government is monitoring the communications of Australians closely with apps such as WeChat	2022	0.5	2.7	2.7	26.2	17.8	24.9	25.1
	2021	0.8	2.5	3.1	20.3	26.4	21.1	25.8

Table 25A Support for banning apps such as TikTok and WeChat (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australia should ban Chinese-owned apps such as TikTok and WeChat	2022	5.9	9.9	8.9	28.0	13.4	16.7	17.2
	2021	4.3	9.2	10.6	26.0	17.0	13.3	19.6

Table 26A The Belt and Road Initiative

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government is right not to sign up to/ participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative	2022	1.8	3.1	2.5	35.3	17.2	19.9	20.2
	2021	1.4	1.4	3.5	40.4	14.8	18.1	20.5

Table 27A The South China Sea (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
China's artificial island-building in the South China Sea is a threat to Australia's security	2022	1.6	3.9	7.0	24.0	20.5	22.1	20.9
	2021	5.6	3.7	3.7	27.8	13.0	25.9	20.4

## 5. The United States

Table 28A Australia's relationships with the United States and China (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australia can enjoy a good relationship with both China and the United States at the same time	2022	2.8	4.1	11.6	20.9	29.0	22.4	9.2
	2021	2.7	4.6	8.7	21.1	26.3	27.1	9.5
Australia's relationship with China weakens our alliance with the United States	2022	4.1	15.0	16.9	32.8	20.8	8.1	2.4
	2021	4.6	13.7	15.9	33.3	19.0	8.5	5.0
The United States will eventually force Australia to choose between a close relationship with Washington or a close relationship with Beijing	2022	3.8	10.7	14.3	29.5	21.6	13.0	7.1
	2021	3.7	11.0	12.6	33.7	23.1	11.4	4.5
China will eventually force Australia to choose between a close relationship with Beijing or a close relationship with Washington	2022	2.4	8.4	9.3	33.5	23.1	14.9	8.4
	2021	1.9	7.9	10.4	28.6	25.1	15.4	10.8

Table 29A The US and China's regional influence (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
China has more influence than the US in Australia's regional neighbourhood	2022	1.1	3.1	6.6	28.0	28.4	21.6	11.2
	2021	0.9	2.5	5.7	25.9	29.5	22.8	12.7

**Table 30A The US and China’s willingness to mete out economic punishment over political disagreements (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The United States government is willing to use its trade and investment ties with Australia to punish Australia over political disagreements	2022	5.3	13.5	11.2	36.6	19.1	10.9	3.4
	2021	6.0	10.2	14.8	36.2	20.2	9.6	3.0
The Chinese government is willing to use its trade and investment ties with Australia to punish Australia over political disagreements	2022	1.3	2.6	4.1	18.3	21.9	27.7	24.1
	2021	1.0	1.6	3.9	16.2	17.8	25.4	34.0

## 6. Trade and investment

Table 31A Views on the Australia-China economic relationship overall (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australia is too economically reliant on China	2022	0.6	1.3	5.1	19.2	27.8	26.8	19.2
	2021	0.0	1.5	1.8	16.4	27.9	25.1	27.2
The Chinese government's recent placement of trade restrictions on Australian exports is extremely worrying	2022	0.9	1.2	4.3	17.0	25.7	26.3	24.5
	2021	1.8	1.2	4.8	14.7	23.6	25.7	28.3
The Australian government has been successful in efforts to diversify trade, reducing Australia's economic exposure to China	2022	4.4	7.0	14.9	31.3	25.9	12.0	4.4
	2021	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Without close engagement with China, Australia would not be as prosperous as it currently is	2022	2.5	3.5	10.8	23.2	28.0	23.6	8.3
	2021	3.1	4.6	8.2	21.5	32.2	20.7	9.7
Trade with China has created job opportunities in Australia	2022	2.8	4.0	4.7	24.8	28.6	24.8	10.2
	2021	3.0	3.4	5.0	23.8	24.0	31.2	9.7
Australia's economic relationship with China is more of an economic risk than an economic opportunity	2022	1.9	6.4	9.3	31.5	25.4	19.3	6.1
	2021	1.5	6.6	11.4	27.2	24.4	19.5	9.4
The Australian government needs to be supportive of having closer economic ties with China	2022	3.2	6.4	10.3	29.6	27.7	16.4	6.4
	2021	5.6	4.6	9.7	31.1	28.8	15.3	4.8

Table 32A The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement has been beneficial for Australia	2022	2.5	5.0	7.8	35.6	22.5	22.5	4.1
	2021	2.4	4.2	5.9	35.2	25.3	21.6	5.3

**Table 33A Expansion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (%)**

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government should support China's bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement which 11 countries, including Australia, signed in 2018	7.7	8.3	7.7	44.9	15.7	12.6	3.1
The Australian government should support Taiwan's bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement which 11 countries, including Australia, signed in 2018	1.8	3.1	3.1	26.5	23.4	23.1	19.1

**Table 34A Trade case study: Tourism (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Tourists from China provide a major economic benefit to Australia	2022	2.5	3.4	4.4	19.9	27.9	29.4	12.5
	2021	2.4	3.7	3.1	16.4	27.9	32.1	14.4
Australia should continue to work towards making Australia an attractive destination for Chinese tourists	2022	4.2	4.9	7.2	21.8	27.4	24.3	10.3
	2021	3.4	5.3	5.8	22.4	25.6	26.4	11.1
Encouraging tourism from China needs to be a post-COVID-19 priority for Australia	2022	5.5	7.7	9.4	24.3	26.3	19.1	7.8
	2021	6.2	8.9	8.3	25.3	25.8	16.7	8.7

Table 35A Trade case study: Education (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
International students from China provide a major economic benefit to Australia	2022	4.1	2.5	4.5	21.8	28.0	28.8	10.3
	2021	0.9	0.9	5.8	16.1	26.9	35.0	14.3
Australian universities are too financially reliant on international students from China	2022	1.2	0.4	9.0	14.3	28.6	20.4	26.1
	2021	0.4	2.2	0.9	15.4	25.1	28.2	27.8
Encouraging international students from China to return to study in Australia needs to be a post-COVID-19 priority for Australia	2022	5.3	7.4	11.9	29.9	26.2	15.6	3.7
	2021	10.4	9.5	8.6	26.2	21.7	16.7	6.8

Table 36A Views on foreign investment from China overall (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Foreign investment from China has created job opportunities in Australia	2022	5.0	5.3	7.2	29.5	34.1	14.4	4.4
	2021	3.7	6.5	9.0	30.7	31.9	15.9	2.4
Foreign investment from China should be supported by Australians	2022	10.7	10.1	15.1	33.7	18.2	7.7	4.6
	2021	12.0	11.6	15.4	31.9	20.7	6.7	1.8
Foreign investment from China is more detrimental than beneficial to Australia	2022	3.1	4.2	10.3	33.3	21.9	14.0	13.3
	2021	2.1	4.7	11.9	30.5	22.2	16.1	12.4

Table 37A Investment case study: Port of Darwin

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government should force Landbridge, the Chinese company that bought the 99-year-lease to the Port of Darwin in 2015, to sell the port back to the government	3.0	3.9	6.1	27.5	13.6	17.1	28.8

Table 38A Investment case study: Agriculture (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Chinese ownership of agricultural assets (e.g., land, food processing facilities) in Australia is more concerning than ownership by companies from other countries	2022	2.3	3.1	6.7	23.2	27.2	21.1	16.4
	2021	2.1	4.5	6.2	21.8	21.2	22.9	21.3
Chinese ownership of agricultural assets (e.g., land, food processing facilities) in Australia presents a threat to Australia's food security	2022	1.1	2.3	7.0	20.3	26.5	22.6	20.1
	2021	1.8	4.3	5.7	17.8	26.6	21.7	22.1
Chinese investment in agricultural assets (e.g., land, food processing facilities) in Australia is more beneficial than detrimental to Australia's interests	2022	12.9	12.9	15.9	28.3	16.7	9.5	3.8
	2021	11.9	15.6	17.8	26.1	14.3	6.8	7.3

Table 39A Investment case study: Residential real estate (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Chinese investment in Australian residential real estate brings a lot of benefits for Australians (e.g., construction, new dwellings, jobs)	2022	12.0	12.0	15.6	27.0	18.9	10.4	4.1
	2021	13.2	16.5	13.7	23.4	21.9	8.5	2.7
Foreign buyers from China drive up Australian housing prices	2022	0.5	1.1	4.9	14.4	24.1	26.0	29.0
	2021	1.0	1.8	5.0	10.1	22.9	31.2	28.1
Chinese investors in Australian real estate have made it difficult for first home buyers in Australia to enter the market	2022	1.4	3.3	6.1	18.5	19.0	23.1	28.7
	2021	1.8	3.3	6.3	19.8	21.4	20.1	27.4
Chinese investors have negatively affected the rental market for residential real estate in Australia	2022	1.6	3.3	7.0	19.2	21.7	22.2	24.9
	2021	2.3	2.5	5.3	20.5	24.6	23.8	21.0
Australia should restrict the amount of investment in residential real estate that is permitted from Chinese investors	2022	1.3	2.2	3.0	13.7	16.7	21.0	42.2
	2021	2.0	1.5	3.8	14.6	16.9	23.7	37.5

Table 40A Support for business ties (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australian companies should continue to pursue business opportunities with China	2022	1.9	2.5	9.5	25.3	27.8	25.9	7.0
	2021	4.1	3.3	7.5	23.7	32.6	21.1	7.7



Table 41A **Concerns about business ties (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australia should not do business with China because of their record on human rights	2022	4.4	6.6	12.9	27.6	21.0	17.6	10.0
	2021	2.9	10.7	14.3	28.9	19.0	15.6	8.6
Australia should not do business with China because of their domestic censorship of media, internet and other forms of communication	2022	3.7	9.5	16.8	28.4	23.1	10.6	8.0
	2021	2.4	11.6	16.1	27.8	23.3	11.8	7.1
Australia should not do business with China because of their record on environmental practices	2022	3.4	10.0	16.1	34.5	20.9	9.2	5.8
	2021	5.0	13.7	16.8	32.6	18.3	6.2	7.3

## 7. Society

Table 42A Impact of political tensions on the Australian-Chinese community (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Political tensions in the Australia-China relationship are negatively impacting Australians of Chinese origin	2022	1.5	5.0	7.8	26.4	30.8	20.0	1.5
	2021	2.3	3.8	3.8	26.9	30.3	21.2	11.8

Table 43A Perceptions of Chinese government influence on the Australian-Chinese community (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australians of Chinese origin can be mobilised by the Chinese government to undermine Australia's interests and social cohesion	2022	4.9	8.5	13.6	30.9	21.3	12.7	8.1
	2021	6.4	12.7	10.7	30.9	22.1	10.0	7.3

Table 44A Foreign interference stemming from China (%)

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Foreign interference in Australia stemming from China is more concerning than foreign interference from other countries	2.3	4.8	6.1	19.7	25.6	24.8	16.7

Table 45A Foreign interference – Country comparisons (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Foreign interference in Australia stemming from China is a major problem	2022	1.5	2.5	4.1	23.1	28.7	22.8	17.3
	2021	0.6	2.4	4.5	21.0	28.6	21.0	22.0
Foreign interference in Australia stemming from the United States is a major problem	2022	5.3	9.9	13.9	32.2	20.5	10.6	7.6
	2021	5.1	9.0	14.3	34.4	20.6	11.8	4.7
Foreign interference in Australia stemming from Russia is a major problem	2022	1.5	3.3	7.1	23.3	28.4	21.8	14.7
	2021	1.8	4.9	7.6	38.4	22.2	17.3	7.8

Table 46A The Australian government's response to Chinese government interference in Australia (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The Australian government is successfully responding to Chinese government interference in Australia	2022	4.1	9.9	18.7	36.5	18.7	11.6	0.5
	2021	4.9	10.2	16.9	33.3	20.7	10.0	3.9

Table 47A Perceptions of the impact of Chinese government influence on Australian values and traditions (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australian values and traditions are being undermined by Chinese government influence in Australia	2022	3.5	8.5	14.2	25.8	20.0	17.2	10.8
	2021	3.6	10.9	11.5	28.4	19.2	15.7	10.6

Table 48A **Support for the use of sanctions legislation (%)**

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australia should place sanctions, such as travel and financial bans, on Chinese officials and entities involved in human rights violations	2.6	2.9	5.4	24.0	26.5	20.1	18.5

Table 49A **Arbitrary detention (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
The risk of arbitrary detention is a concern when considering travel to China	2022	2.2	2.2	8.3	21.3	25.4	20.0	20.6
	2021	1.3	1.5	4.4	21.0	23.1	26.2	22.6
China is willing to detain/arrest Australian citizens without any legal basis to punish Australia over political disagreements	2022	2.8	4.4	5.1	22.5	25.9	20.9	18.4
	2021	3.4	3.4	3.4	22.3	21.6	25.2	20.8

Table 50A **Views on international students (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
International students from China help strengthen the people-to-people links (e.g., family, friendships, business contacts, tourism) between the two countries	2022	6.2	4.9	4.9	29.6	28.0	17.7	8.6
	2021	3.6	6.7	9.3	22.7	30.7	21.8	5.3
International students from China are potentially reducing the quality of education at Australian universities	2022	4.9	15.4	15.8	31.6	15.4	10.1	6.9
	2021	9.6	14.2	16.9	19.6	14.6	10.5	14.6
International students from China mean there are less places for domestic students to study in their choice of Australian university	2022	4.5	13.4	10.6	29.3	22.8	12.6	6.9
	2021	2.2	11.6	17.4	27.2	21.4	9.8	10.3

## 8. University and research

Table 51A Freedom of academic speech (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Australian university ties with China compromise Australian freedom of speech	2022	2.8	7.3	14.2	25.6	24.8	17.1	8.1
	2021	2.7	8.0	12.9	28.1	21.0	13.4	13.8

Table 52A Research collaboration (General) (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
Academics from Australia should continue to partner with academics from China to undertake research projects	2022	2.4	4.9	7.3	24.7	32.4	20.2	8.1
Research collaborations between academics from Australia and China makes Australia more competitive internationally	2022	3.3	4.5	4.5	38.9	27.0	20.1	1.6
	2021	2.6	5.3	7.5	36.6	27.8	15.9	4.4

Table 53A Research collaboration (Science) (%)

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
It is beneficial for Australian scientists to have research connections to China	2022	2.8	5.0	6.5	22.5	30.1	21.9	11.3
	2021	3.5	3.5	6.9	17.9	27.5	30.2	10.4
Australian scientists working with Chinese scientists is beneficial for Australia	2022	3.7	3.3	3.5	20.3	34.5	26.2	8.5
	2021	3.3	6.0	5.8	20.4	28.3	27.1	9.0

# 9. Global and regional cooperation

Table 54A **Benefits of global and regional cooperation (%)**

	Year	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neutral (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
It is beneficial for Australia to work with China on global issues, such as climate change and global health	2022	3.0	3.5	4.8	19.5	23.2	31.5	14.5
	2021	3.1	4.4	2.7	15.8	28.7	29.1	16.2
It is beneficial for Australia to work with China on regional issues, such as ending malaria in the Pacific	2022	2.4	3.4	3.7	18.1	33.0	26.9	12.5
	2021	4.4	3.5	4.4	15.7	27.6	34.4	10.0

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
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