

Chinese-Australian and Chinese-American views on news: A comparative study

Wanning Sun

December 16 2024

Australia and the US are strategic allies. Although the two nations are different in terms of geography, global power status and domestic race politics, both are favourite destinations of outbound migration from the People's Republic of China (PRC). In recent years, there has been a notable shift in English-language news reporting and public commentary in both countries on PRC-related issues. In view of these factors, a comparison of the prevailing sentiments and views of Chinese-Australian and Chinese-American communities can facilitate a deeper understanding of the wider impact of media rhetoric on diasporic Chinese communities – an impact that may have implications for social cohesion in Australia and the US, as well as in other nations.

This analysis undertakes a comparative study of recent surveys from Australia and the US.¹ It highlights some key commonalities between Chinese-Australians and Chinese-Americans in their reactions to their domestic English-language media's coverage of the PRC, bilateral relations with PRC, as well as to coverage about ethnic Chinese communities.

Key takeaways

- Both Chinese-Australians and Chinese-Americans reported a low level of confidence and trust in their domestic English-language media's coverage of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and of issues affecting their nation's bilateral relations with the PRC.
- Both Chinese-Australians and Chinese-Americans reported that the tenor of their domestic English-language media's reporting on the PRC and their nation's bilateral relationship with the PRC had impacted on their personal lives and caused tension in their interpersonal relationships and broader social circles.

¹ This analysis draws predominantly on Australian and US survey data published in 2023 and 2024. For Australia, survey data is drawn from Wanning Sun, *First-generation PRC Migrants and Social Cohesion: Views on News about the PRC and Chinese-Australians*, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney, August 30 2023 <<https://www.uts.edu.au/acri/research-and-opinion/reports/first-generation-prc-migrants-and-social-cohesion-views-news-about-prc-and-chinese-australians>>. For the US, survey data is drawn from: Qin Gao, Jennifer So, Samuel Collitt and Stacie Tao, *The Fight for Representation: The State of Chinese Americans 2022*, School of Social Work, Columbia University and Committee of 100, August 2 2023 <<https://www.committee100.org/our-work/the-state-of-chinese-americans-survey/>>; and Nathan Kar Ming Chan, Vivien Leung and Sam Collitt, *State of Chinese-Americans Survey 2024*, Committee of 100 and NORC, University of Chicago, September 2024 <<https://www.committee100.org/our-work/the-state-of-chinese-americans-survey-2024/>>. For details of the data-gathering methods used in these studies, please see the methodology outlined in the original reports.

- Both Chinese–Australians and Chinese–Americans reported that continuous media focus on threats posed by the PRC had a significant impact on their mental and emotional wellbeing.
- Both Chinese–Australians and Chinese–Americans reported feeling anxious and fearful in response to media speculation about the possibility of a war with the PRC.

Introduction

The number of Chinese migrants in many English-speaking Western countries has grown exponentially over the last few decades. As citizens with civic duties and voting rights, people of Chinese descent are fast becoming an important political force in English-speaking multicultural societies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, particularly as their communities increase as a proportion of overall population. The prevailing views and sentiments expressed by this segment of these national populations have in parallel become a matter of interest to governments and policymakers who are charged with the mandate of strengthening multicultural social cohesion.

At the same time, the world has witnessed a significant geopolitical power reconfiguration over the past few years which has rendered these Western nations' bilateral relationships with the People's Republic of China (PRC) increasingly fraught. Tensions have manifested themselves in the form of ideological conflict, trade disputes and military tensions. A view of the PRC as a major source of anxiety has firmly taken hold in the public sphere.²

The volume of news and current affairs content related to the PRC in Australian English-language media has also increased exponentially over the past decade, particularly since 2017.³ Around the same time, the US-PRC trade war and other bilateral tensions started to become a fixture in the US English-language media landscape.⁴ The general tenor of reportage in both nations has been one of significant anxiety about the PRC and the multifaceted threats it poses.⁵

Following a period during which Beijing deployed coercive economic measures against Australia, a change of government from the Coalition to the Australian Labor Party in 2022 led to the gradual stabilisation of diplomatic relations with Beijing, as well as the adoption of more moderate rhetoric by both sides. However, the broader narrative of the PRC threat continues, with one contributing factor being the Labor government's endorsement of the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, a pact that is essentially justified on the implicit assumption of threats posed by Beijing. With an Australian federal election looming in 2025, there also remains the question about what a Coalition win might mean for Australia-PRC bilateral relations.

While Australia has had to manage living with economic coercion from the PRC, in the US, rivalry between Washington and Beijing, particularly in the areas of technology, scientific research and manufacturing capacity, has intensified.⁶ Having long maintained supremacy in the Asia-Pacific, Washington is gravely

2 For Australia, see Elena Collinson and Paul Burke, *UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2024: The Australia-China Relationship: What do Australians Think?*, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney, June 12 2024 <<https://www.uts.edu.au/acri/research-and-opinion/polling/utsacribida-poll-2024>>. For Canada, see 'Friends and foes: Most Canadians say Ottawa should approach China as a 'threat' or 'enemy'', Angus Reid Institute, March 10 2023 <<https://angusreid.org/canada-us-china-friends-foes-favourability-of-nations/>>. For New Zealand, see *New Zealanders' Perceptions of Asia and Asian Peoples*, Asia New Zealand Foundation, June 18 2024 <<https://www.asianz.org.nz/our-resources/reports/new-zealanders-perceptions-of-asia-and-asian-peoples-2024>>. For the US, see Craig Kafura, 'American views of China hit all-time low', Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 24 2024 <<https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/american-views-china-hit-all-time-low>>.

3 Iris Zhao, 'Australian media's coverage of China soars in last year, led by Hong Kong and US-China trade war', *ABC News*, September 27 2019 <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-27/australian-medias-coverage-of-china-hong-kong-trump-trade/11538770>>.

4 Louisa Ha and Lars Willnat (eds.), *The U.S.–China Trade War: Global News Framing and Public Opinion in the Digital Age*, (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 2022).

5 For a comprehensive reference to this range of issues, see David Brophy, *China Panic: Australia's Alternative to Paranoia and Pandering* (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2021).

6 Scott Kennedy, 'US-China relations in 2024: Managing competition without conflict', Centre for Strategic and Independent Studies, January 3 2024 <<https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-china-relations-2024-managing-competition-without-conflict>>.

concerned about the prospect of ceding dominance to the PRC.⁷ With Donald Trump emerging the victor in the recent US presidential election, his ‘America First’ agenda portends more turbulence for US-PRC relations.

A particularly alarming trope in the PRC threat narrative is the possibility of a war with the PRC, potentially over Taiwan. In recent years, media speculation about a possible conflict between the PRC and the US – and Australia’s potential role in the war as an ally of the US – has intensified in both countries.⁸

Recent polling shows that media speculation in Australia and the US about a possible war with the PRC, and about the PRC threat narrative more broadly, is of significant concern to both Chinese-Australians and Chinese-Americans. Members of these communities said that how the PRC government is portrayed in the media is correlated with negative attitudes toward Chinese diaspora communities among the general public.⁹ Indeed, this fear has been confirmed by survey research conducted in 2021.¹⁰

Australia and the US are strategic security allies. Although the two nations are different in terms of geography, global power status, and domestic race politics, both are favourite destinations of outbound migration from the PRC. Since the impact of such media narratives on Chinese-Australians and Chinese-Americans may have significant, long-term implications for social cohesion in Australia, and for the principles of diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) that are promoted in the US,¹¹ it is valuable to compare how the Chinese communities in these two countries respond to media reporting on PRC-related matters.

There are two caveats to this analysis, which is based on a juxtaposition of two corpora of data: a 2023 survey of Chinese-Australians conducted by the author for the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI); and 2022 and 2024 surveys of Chinese-Americans conducted by Columbia University and the Committee of 100, and the Committee of 100 and the University of Chicago, respectively. The first qualification is the different focuses of surveys. The 2023 UTS:ACRI survey aimed to gauge Chinese-Australians’ responses to English-language media – a process which engendered valuable information about the participants’ lived experiences. The 2022 Columbia University/Committee of 100 and 2024 Committee of 100/University of Chicago surveys aimed to ‘provide needed insights about the lived experiences, policy preferences, and political activity of Chinese-Americans’, of which Chinese-Americans’ responses to English-language media is an important part. The second qualification relates to the demographic composition of the survey participants. While the 2023 UTS:ACRI survey respondents were comprised entirely of first-generation migrants from the PRC, the 2022 Columbia University/Committee of 100 and 2024 Committee of 100/University of Chicago surveys included ‘individuals who self-reported only as Chinese’. For instance, the 2024 Committee of 100/University of Chicago survey included 76 percent of the participants born overseas but also

7 See, e.g., Van Jackson, ‘The problem with primacy: America’s dangerous quest to dominate the Pacific’, *Foreign Affairs*, January 16 2023 <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/asia/problem-primacy>>.

8 For Australia, see, e.g., Peter Harther and Matthew Knott, ‘Australia faces the threat of war with China within three years – and we’re not ready’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, March 7 2023 <<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/red-alert-20230306-p5cpt8.html>>; James Curran, ‘Excess baggage: Is China a genuine threat to Australia’, *Australian Foreign Affairs*, 19 (2024), pp. 6-27 <<https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/essay/2023/10/the-new-domino-theory>>. For the US, see, e.g., Morgan Phillips, ‘Would the US win a war with China over Taiwan? US lawmakers briefed on the potential outcome’, *Fox News*, November 21 2024 <<https://www.foxnews.com/politics/china-wargames-taiwan-us>>; Charlie Campbell, ‘U.S. General’s prediction of war with China ‘in 2025’ risks turning worst fears into reality’, *Time*, January 31 2023 <<https://time.com/6251419/us-china-general-war-2025/>>.

9 Wanning Sun, *First-generation PRC migrants and social cohesion: Views on News about the PRC and Chinese-Australians*, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney, August 30 2023 <<https://www.uts.edu.au/acri/research-and-opinion/reports/first-generation-prc-migrants-and-social-cohesion-views-news-about-prc-and-chinese-australians>>; Qin Gao, Jennifer So, Samuel Collitt and Stacie Tao, *The Fight for Representation: The State of Chinese Americans 2022*, School of Social Work, Columbia University and Committee of 100, August 2 2023 <<https://www.committee100.org/our-work/the-state-of-chinese-americans-survey/>>; Nathan Kar Ming Chan, Vivien Leung and Sam Collitt, *State of Chinese-Americans Survey 2024*, Committee of 100 and NORC, University of Chicago, September 2024 <<https://www.committee100.org/our-work/the-state-of-chinese-americans-survey-2024/>>.

10 Xiao Tan, Rennie Lee and Leah Ruppanner, ‘The nexus between China’s global image and attitudes toward diasporic Chinese: A comparison of Australia and the United States’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 33 (146) (2022), pp. 332-351 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2127087>>.

11 At the same time, DEI policies are also experiencing pushback in the US. It remains to be seen what the ultimate settling point will be on this front. See, e.g., Nicquel Terry Ellis, ‘What is DEI and why is it dividing America?’, *CNN*, March 11 2024 <<https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/09/us/what-is-dei-and-why-its-dividing-america/index.html>>; Jamie Joseph, ‘US state lawmakers, companies prepare to push back against diversity, equity and inclusion, ‘woke’ initiatives: experts’, *Sky News Australia*, November 25 2024 <<https://www.skynews.com.au/world-news/united-states/us-state-lawmakers-companies-prepare-to-push-back-against-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-woke-initiatives-experts/news-story/47122027f3def1ddf595f6c14f8e8b12>>; Michael Sainato, ‘A huge regression’: Walmart’s DEI rollback incites new racial equity push’, *The Guardian*, December 15 2024 <<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/dec/15/walmart-dei-diversity-equity-inclusion-rollback>>.

included 24 percent born in the US. These caveats notwithstanding, it is possible to compare the Chinese-Australian and Chinese-American experiences.

Trust in fairness of reporting

A lack of trust in media and the government is widely considered to be detrimental to citizens' sense of inclusion, and the role of media in building this trust is crucial.¹² To gain the public's trust, it is important for citizens to have a high level of confidence that key media institutions have both the intention and ability to report on important issues fairly and accurately.

The 2024 Committee of 100/University of Chicago survey asked Chinese-Americans how much confidence they had in American English-language media to fairly and accurately report news about the PRC and US-PRC relations. A majority of Chinese-Americans (51 percent) said they have either 'no confidence' (18 percent) or 'a little confidence' (37 percent). Thirty-eight percent said they have a 'moderate' amount of confidence, while only five percent said they have 'a lot' of confidence, and two percent said they have 'a great deal' of confidence.

In 2023, Chinese-Australian respondents were asked, 'To what extent do you trust the Australian English-language media to publish fair and balanced reports about China?' Just over half (51 percent) expressed a reluctance to trust Australian English-language media to publish fair and balanced reports about PRC. Thirteen percent said they 'completely distrust', 38 percent said that they 'mostly do not trust', and another 27 percent said they only 'trust a little'. Only 17 percent said they 'completely trust' Australian English-language media.¹³

In contrast, the Australian general public reported a much higher level of trust in Australian English-language media to publish fair and balanced reports about the PRC. In 2022, 61 percent of Australians surveyed in a poll conducted by the Lowy Institute characterised the Australian media's coverage of the PRC as 'fair and balanced'.¹⁴

No comparable data is available in the US, although a Pew Research survey on the PRC's global role in 2023 indicated that negative views of the PRC continue to be high following the COVID-19 pandemic: 83 percent of US adults said they had an 'unfavourable' view of the country, including 44 percent who said they held a 'very unfavourable' view.¹⁵ Separately, an earlier Pew Research Center survey indicated that American audiences tend to place more trust in their domestic media's reporting on the PRC over its the reporting on other foreign countries and entities such as Germany and the European Union.¹⁶ If these two sets of data are triangulated, it may be safe to speculate that although the American general public have demonstrated a low level of trust in the media overall,¹⁷ the majority of people in the US may have placed a higher level of trust in their media's coverage of the PRC as compared with its coverage of other issues.

In other words, the general public in both Australia and the US seem to place much more trust in their domestic media's coverage of the PRC than the Chinese communities in each country do.

¹² Bill McDermott, 'Trust is at breaking point. It's time to rebuild it', World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2019, World Economic Forum, January 14 2019 <<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/trust-is-at-breaking-point-it-s-time-to-rebuild-it/>>.

¹³ This question was asked in the survey which informed the author's 2023 UTS:ACRI report although was not included in the final report write-up.

¹⁴ Jennifer Hsu, *Being Chinese in Australia: Public Opinion in Chinese Communities*, Lowy Institute, April 2023 <<https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/chinese-communities/>>.

¹⁵ Laura Silver, Christine Huang, Laura Clancy and Moira Fagan, 'Americans are critical of China's global role – as well as its relationship with Russia', Pew Research Center, April 12 2023 <<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/04/12/americans-are-critical-of-chinas-global-role-as-well-as-its-relationship-with-russia/>>.

¹⁶ Laura Silver and Elisa Shearer, 'Americans in news media 'bubbles' think differently about foreign policy than others', Pew Research Center, June 2 2021 <<https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/06/02/americans-in-news-media-bubbles-think-differently-about-foreign-policy-than-others/>>.

¹⁷ Megan Brennan, 'Media confidence in U.S. matches 2016 record low', Gallup, October 19 2023 <<https://news.gallup.com/poll/512861/media-confidence-matches-2016-record-low.aspx>>.

Impact of media rhetoric on interpersonal relationships

In multicultural societies such as Australia and the US, the extent to which members of racial minorities feel capable of identifying with mainstream English-language public is an important benchmark of inclusive citizenship. Not being able to do so may lead to a sense of alienation and a feeling of worthlessness on the part of racial minorities.¹⁸

According to the 2024 Committee of 100/University of Chicago survey, 61 percent of Chinese-Americans said that the language and rhetoric used by US English-language news media when reporting on the PRC negatively affected how they are treated by strangers. To a lesser extent, they also said that their relationships among acquaintances (26 percent) and co-workers (25 percent) were negatively affected. About one-fifth (18 percent) said that their relationship with their boss or supervisor was negatively impacted. The survey also finds that respondents' relationships with friends (11 percent), family (8 percent) and, with partners and loved ones (60 percent) were also negatively affected.

The 2022 Committee of 100/Columbia University survey also pointed to similar concerns. When asked if relations between countries can impact the daily lives of people through foreign and domestic policies as well as political and media discourse, 38 percent said narratives about how tensions between the US and the PRC have profoundly impacted their daily lives, families, and communities.

While its question on the same subject matter was phrased somewhat differently, the 2023 UTS:ACRI survey pointed to similar results. When asked how they handled disagreements with colleagues, friends and acquaintances from non-PRC backgrounds about media coverage of the PRC, about one-third (32 percent) said, 'I would tell them that they have been misled by the media'; nearly half (48 percent) said, 'I'd tell them what I think, in the hope that they are open to accepting a different point of view'. However, 22 percent said, 'I wouldn't express my disagreement because I wouldn't want to start an argument or cause embarrassment'; and four percent said, 'I wouldn't express my disagreement because I'd be afraid they'd call me a spy'.

When the same Chinese-Australian respondents were asked, 'Do you think Australian media reports about Chinese influence would affect public perceptions of the Chinese-Australian communities?', 70 percent said, 'It has made [the Australian public] more unfriendly or suspicious towards Chinese-Australian communities.'

The 2023 UTS:ACRI survey also showed that the Australian English-language media's tendency to focus on geopolitical tensions between Australia and the PRC, as well as their tendency to depict the PRC as a hostile country, have posed serious challenges for PRC migrants in their efforts to negotiate a dual identity as Chinese-Australians and to be accepted into Australian society. A majority of survey respondents (76 percent), for example, said that they either rarely or never feel that they have a say in shaping public debates.

This level of concern is similarly reflected amongst Chinese-Americans. The 2024 Committee of 100/University of Chicago survey asked whether the rhetoric and language used by American English-language media on about the PRC and US-PRC relations have affected how people from outside the community treat them and others of Chinese descent. Sixty-one percent of Chinese-Americans said that such rhetoric either 'somewhat negatively' (50 percent) or 'very negatively' (11 percent) affected how strangers treat them and others of Chinese descent.

Impact of media content on mental health and emotional well-being

Psychological research shows that regular consumption of distressing news media can have serious negative effects on one's mental health and emotional well-being.¹⁹

¹⁸ Andrew Jakubowicz, 'The media and social cohesion', in James Jupp, John Nieuwenhuysen and Emma Dawson (eds.), *Social Cohesion in Australia* (Port Melbourne, Victoria: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 158–169.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Charlotte Huff, 'Media overload is hurting our mental health', *Monitor on Psychology*, American Psychological Association, November 1 2022 <<https://www.apa.org/monitor/2022/11/strain-media-overload>>.

The 2024 Committee of 100/University of Chicago survey suggested that discrimination, even hatred, towards Chinese-Americans continued to affect the mental health of the members in this community for years after the COVID-19 pandemic. Respondents said they continued to struggle with mental health issues and were not satisfied with the way their local elected officials had responded to their complaints. Two-thirds (66 percent) said they felt that ‘everything was an effort’ while nearly two-thirds (64 percent) also said they felt ‘nervous’. Additionally, 55 percent said they felt ‘restless’ and 50 percent said they felt ‘hopeless’, while 43 percent said they felt ‘depressed’ and 39 percent said they felt ‘worthless’ at least some of the time when asked a question about their ‘recent mental health issues’.

The 2023 UTS:ACRI survey asked respondents to relay their emotional, rather than mental, reactions to public attitudes towards them, yet responses were broadly comparable. Asked ‘What are your main emotional reactions when you see media reports about China that you believe are not fair or accurate?’, the most dominant reaction (63 percent) was of feeling ‘helpless’. Another (35 percent) reported feeling ‘angry’, followed by those who said they felt ‘baffled’ (25 percent). Twenty percent said they felt ‘sad’. Only one percent said they that they felt ‘happy’, while another one percent said they felt ‘satisfied’.

Impact of ‘war talk’ in the media

Over the past two years, speculation in Australian English-language media about the prospect of Australian involvement in a military conflict between the PRC and the US has gathered momentum.²⁰ In response to the question ‘How concerned are you about what might happen to you if Australia went to war with China?’, a large majority of Chinese-Australians respondents (91 percent) expressed some level of concern, including 55 percent who said they were ‘extremely concerned’ and 36 percent who said they were ‘quite concerned’.

Subsequent interviews with individuals revealed three major drivers behind these concerns. The first was an uncertainty about what would happen to them if military conflict eventuated. The second was a fear that loose talk about war in the media could make such conflict more likely. The third was an anxiety that they would be rendered more vulnerable to racist attacks and treated as potential agents of a hostile country so long as such talk of war persisted.

Talk of possible military conflict has also been a constant refrain in American English-language media.²¹ Qualitative data in the 2022 Committee of 100/Columbia University survey revealed that Chinese-Americans had similar concerns about persistent media discussion of possible war between the US and the PRC. Some were apprehensive that this could render military conflict a self-fulfilling prophecy, while others expressed anxiety about an uncertain future facing their families and communities if such conflict were to transpire.

Conclusion

There is a marked similarity between responses by Chinese-Australians and Chinese-Americans to English-language media coverage of the PRC and their communities in their respective countries, underscoring a lack of trust and confidence in media reporting on both subject matters.

Survey data revealed a direct connection between how the PRC and Chinese-Australian and Chinese-American communities are represented in media, and members of these communities’ experiences with racism and discrimination, as well detrimental impacts on their mental and emotional wellbeing.

Data from both countries showed that the impact of rhetoric on the PRC threat on both Chinese-Australians and Chinese-Americans did not start, nor has it finished with, the COVID-19 pandemic.

²⁰ See, e.g., Peter Hartcher and Matthew Knott, ‘Australia faces the threat of war with China within three years – and we’re not ready’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, March 7 2023 <<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/red-alert-20230306-p5cpt8.html>>; Andrew Tillett, ‘The ‘frightening discussion’ Australia needs to have about China’, *The Australian Financial Review*, April 19, 2024 <<https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/the-frightening-discussion-australia-needs-to-have-about-china-20240419-p5fi4q>>.

²¹ Morgan Phillips, ‘Would the US win a war with China over Taiwan? US lawmakers briefed on the potential outcome’, *Fox News*, November 21 2024 <<https://www.foxnews.com/politics/china-wargames-taiwan-us>>; Charlie Campbell, ‘U.S. General's prediction of war with China ‘in 2025’ risks turning worst fears into reality’, *Time*, January 31 2023 <<https://time.com/6251419/us-china-general-war-2025/>>.

Both Chinese-Australians and Chinese-Americans face the geopolitical reality of living in a country that increasingly sees the PRC as a hostile nation, and possibly for this reason, they share a range of sentiments and views. However, it is worth bearing in mind that there could be several other factors that may shape their lived realities in different ways. For instance, the Chinese-Australian population is much larger as a proportion of national percentage than their Chinese-American counterparts. Moreover, voting is compulsory in Australia, as compared with voluntary voting in the US. While Asian-Australians are the largest racial minorities in Australia, in the US, the most significant racial minorities are African-Americans and Latino-Americans. Further, while the US and the PRC are engaged in a global power contestation, Australia is a middle power that has to negotiate a difficult position of being caught in tensions between the two powers. Further research is needed to investigate how these differences – as well as the similarities that have been outlined in this analysis – can shape the lived experience of people in both Chinese-Australian and Chinese-American communities.

Author

Wanning Sun is Deputy Director at UTS:ACRI and a Professor of Media and Communication in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at UTS. A fellow of Australian Academy of the Humanities since 2016, she was a member of the ARC College of Experts (2020-2023). As an academic researcher, Professor Sun is best known for her ethnography of rural-to-urban migration in China, and for her study of transnational and diasporic Chinese media. She has produced a significant body of research on the politics of inequality in China. This work can be found in *Maid in China: Media, Morality and the Cultural Politics of Boundaries* (Routledge, 2009), *Subaltern China: Rural Migrants, Media and Cultural Practices* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), and her co-edited volume, *Love Stories in China: The Politics of Intimacy in the Twenty-First Century* (Routledge, 2020). Her latest book on this topic is *Love Troubles: Inequality in China and Its Intimate Consequences* (Bloomsbury, 2023). Over the past two decades, she has spearheaded global diasporic Chinese-language media as a distinct area of research, with the publications of her first book *Leaving China: Media, Migration, and Transnational Imagination* (Routledge, 2002), and three edited books on this topic. Professor Sun also writes a column for *Crikey*.